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1  Introduction 
Most  economists  would  agree  that  an  exogenous  increase  in  the  federal 
fund  rate will  lead  to a fall  in  inflation  and  some  slowdown  in growth  af 
ter a  while;  they would  also  probably  agree  that  a  large  body  of  empiri 
cal  research  is consistent  with  this  view,  although  the  timing  and  size  of 
the  effect  is  subject  to  debate.  In  contrast,  perfectly  reasonable  econo 
mists  can  and  do  disagree  on  the basic  theoretical  effects  of  fiscal  policy 
and  on  the  interpretation  of  the  existing  empirical  evidence.  For  in 
stance,  neoclassical  models  predict  that  private  consumption  and  the 
real wage  should  fall  following  a  positive  shock  to  government  con 
sumption:  when  government  spending  increases,  the  representative 
household  is hit  by  a negative  wealth  effect  due  to  the higher  taxes  it  will 
have  to pay,  and  consumption  and  leisure  fall;  the  resulting  outshift  in 
labor  supply  causes  a decline  in  the  real wage,  along  a given  labor  de 
mand.1  Some  models  with  neo-Keynesian  features  predict  instead  the 
opposite  pattern  of  responses:  government  spending  causes  a  shift  in  la 
bor  demand,  for  instance,  because  of  countercyclical  markups  gener 
ated  by  nominal  price  rigidities  or  other  reasons;  the  resulting  increase 
in the  real wage  can  induce  higher  consumption,  via  a substitution  effect 
or because  of  the presence  of  credit  constraints. 
Also  in contrast  to  the  case  of monetary  policy,  the  existing  empirical 
evidence  can  be  interpreted  as  supporting  either  view,  depending  on  the 
methodology  used  to  identify  the  fiscal  policy  shocks.  The  dummy  vari 
able  approach  of Ramey  and  Shapiro  (1998),  extended  to  a  full-fledged 
VAR  by  Edelberg,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (1999)  and  Burnside,  Eichen 
baum,  and  Fisher  (2004),  is an  application  of  the  event  study  methodol 
ogy  developed  by  Romer  and  Romer  (1989)  to  study  monetary  policy.  It 170  Perotti 
typically  finds  that  during  episodes  of  large,  exogenous  increases  in de 
fense  spending,  output  increases  but  private  consumption  and  the  real 
wage  fall,  providing  support  for  the  neoclassical  model.  The  results 
from  the  structural  vector  autoregression  (SVAR)  approach  of  Fatas  and 
Mihov  (2004),  Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002),  and  Perotti  (2004)  are  typi 
cally  of  the  opposite  sign:  following  a  government  spending  shock, 
private  consumption  and  the  real wage  increase.  This  is consistent  with 
some 
neo-Keynesian  models. 
This  paper  studies  the  robustness  of  these  results  and  investigates 
their  underlying  methodologies.  I first  show  that  the  evidence  from  the 
dummy  variable  approach  is due  to  the  imposition  of  two  restrictions: 
first,  all Ramey-Shapiro  episodes  have  the  same  dynamics,  up  to a  scale 
factor;  second,  in a version  of  this  approach  fiscal  policy  explains  all  the 
deviation  from  normal  of  all  endogenous  variables  for  several  quarters 
after  the  start  of  these  episodes.  The  second  assumption  runs  contrary  to 
the  spirit  of  this  approach,  which  is based  on  the notion  that we  can  learn 
from  these  episodes  because  they  are  exogenous  and  big,  not  because 
they  are  different.  Once  these  restrictions  are  removed,  the  results  from 
this method  are  comparable  to  those  of  the SVAR  approach:  private  con 
sumption  and  the  real wage  increase  in  response  to  the  fiscal  shocks  of 
the Ramey-Shapiro  episodes,  and  there  is  little  sign  of  the movement  in 
opposite  directions  of  consumption  and  GDP  that  is  the hallmark  of  the 
neoclassical  model.  The  existing  differences  between  the  four  episodes 
can  in part  be  explained  by  the different  patterns  of behavior  of  taxation 
and  of  defense  versus  civilian  government  spending  in each  episode:  I 
then  show  that  these  differences  are  also  consistent  with  the  evidence 
from  the  SVAR  approach.  The  latter,  however,  suffers  from  its own  fun 
damental  problem,  namely  the  possibility  that  its  estimated  shocks  are 
in  reality  anticipated  by  the private  sector. 
To  overcome  some  of  the  problems  of  the  two  approaches,  Ramey 
(2006)  advocates  the  estimation  of  fiscal  policy  SVARs  using  long-run 
annual  data.  Over  a  sample  extending  back  to  1889,  the  response  of  con 
sumption  to a government  spending  shock  is again  consistent  with  the 
neoclassical  model,  in  contrast  to  the  quarterly  SVARs  estimated  over 
the  post-war  period.  However,  prior  to  the  official  Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis  (BEA)  statistics,  starting  in  1929,  several  components  of  gov 
ernment  spending  were  linearly  interpolated  over  long  intervals  and 
had  a number  of  other  problems.  When  only  the  official  BEA  data  from 
1929  are  used,  the  responses  of  consumption  and  of  the  real wage  to  a In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  171 
government  spending  shock  again  become  positive  and  can  be  esti 
mated  with  a good  degree  of  precision. 
Two-sector  versions  of  the  neoclassical  and  neo-Keynesian  models 
also  imply  opposite  responses  of  the  real  product  wage  in  the  sector  hit 
by  the  bigger  government  spending  shock.  Hence,  sectoral  evidence 
around  the Ramey-Shapiro  episodes  can  shed  light  on  the  underlying 
mechanism.  Using  the U.S.  input-output  tables,  I show  that  during  the 
last  two  Ramey-Shapiro  episodes  the  sectors  that were  most  intensive  in 
the  government  spending  shock  also  experienced,  on  average,  signifi 
cantly  higher  increases  in  the  real  product  wage.  This  is consistent  with 
some  neo-Keynesian  two-sector  models,  but  difficult  to  reconcile  with 
neoclassical  two-sector  models. 
I then  replicate  the  SVAR  analysis  in three more  countries?Australia, 
Canada,  and  the  United  Kingdom?for  which  both  noninterpolated 
quarterly  data  and  long-run  annual  data  on  fiscal  policy  exist.  The  re 
sults  from  both  the  quarterly  and  the  annual  SVARs  are  qualitatively 
consistent  with  the U.S.  evidence,  although  in general  the  effects  of  fis 
cal policy  shocks  are  smaller. 
In  this  paper,  I focus  on  the  responses  of  consumption  and  the  real 
wage.  These  variables  are  of  independent  interest  to macroeconomists, 
but  also,  as we  have  seen,  they  respond  very  differently  to government 
spending  shocks  in different  models;  hence,  they  are useful  to  shed  light 
on  the  underlying  transmission  mechanism  of  fiscal  policy.  I also  pres 
ent  evidence  on  private  investment,  although  here  the predictions  of  al 
ternative  models  are much  less  precise,  and  depend  on  a number  of  fac 
tors  that  are  difficult  to  control  for  in  a  VAR.  Because  of  space 
constraints,  I  leave  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  responses  of  the  interest 
rate  and  of  inflation  to  future  work.2 
I focus  on  shocks  to  current  government  spending  on  goods  and  ser 
vices  (government  spending)  because  this  is  the  largest  part  of  non 
transfer  spending,  and  the mechanisms  driving  its  effects  in  the  differ 
ent models  are  clearly  identifiable.  Government  investment  introduces 
an  entirely  different  effect?the  externality  on  private  sector  productiv 
ity  in  the  long  run?that  is also  largely  common  to all models.31  also  do 
not  study  the  effects  of  tax  shocks:  these  are more  difficult  to  identify  in 
a SVAR,4  and when  taxation  is distortionary,  their  theoretical  effects  de 
pend  crucially  on  the  time  profile  of  the  tax  response.5 
This  paper  has  several  antecedents:  some  of  the  exercises  that  I per 
form  here  can  be  found  in Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002),  Fatas  and Mi 172  Perotti 
hov  (2001),  Pappa  (2005),  and  Ramey  (2006). Of  course,  several  other  pa 
pers  estimate  impulse  responses  to  fiscal  shocks:  these  will  be  acknowl 
edged. 
The  structure  of  the paper  is as  follows:  section  2 presents  the  two  em 
pirical  approaches  introduced  earlier.  Section  3  briefly  discusses  the 
data  and  the  specification  of  the models  to be  estimated.  Section  4 pres 
ents  the  effects  of  fiscal  shocks  on  GDP,  private  consumption,  and  in 
vestment  in  the  two  approaches.  Section  5 discusses  alternative  expla 
nations  of  the differences  between  the Ramey-Shapiro  episodes,  mainly 
the  tax policies  accompanying  the government-spending  shocks  and  the 
composition  of  government  spending.  Section  6 presents  evidence  from 
estimates  that  use  long-run  annual  data.  Section  7  discusses  the  re 
sponses  of  labor market  variables,  namely  hours  and  the  real wage  in  the 
business  sector  and  in  manufacturing.  Section  8 discusses  the  evidence 
on  labor market  outcomes  from  input-output  tables  around  the Vietnam 
War  and  the  Reagan  buildup.  Section  9 presents  SVAR  evidence  from 
Australia,  Canada,  and  the United  Kingdom.  Section  10 discusses  some 
recent  models  of  fiscal  policy  and  their  key  testable  predictions.  The  last 
section  concludes. 
2  Two  Approaches  to  the  Identification  of  Fiscal  Shocks 
I now  briefly  describe  the  two  approaches  to  identifying  fiscal  policy 
shocks  that will  be  compared  in  this  paper.  A  third  approach  (at  least) 
has  been  used  in  the  literature,  based  on  sign  restrictions,  as  in  Mount 
ford  and  Uhlig  (2002)  and  Pappa  (2005).  For  lack  of  space  I do  not  dis 
cuss  this methodology  here;  however,  Pappa  (2005)  and  Caldara  and 
Kamps  (2006)  show  that  it delivers  responses  of  private  consumption 
that  are  close  to  those  estimated  in  the  SVAR  approach  that  follows: 
in particular,  private  consumption  typically  rises  after  a  government 
spending  shock. 
2.1  The  Dummy  Variable  Approach 
How  to disentangle  the  exogenous,  unanticipated  component  of  fiscal 
policy  changes?  The  narrative  or  dummy  variable  approach  tries  to 
isolate  the  typical  deviation  from  the  normal  path  of  the  endogenous 
variables  caused  by  a  series  of  post-war  abnormal  fiscal  events,  namely 
military  buildups  driven  by  foreign  policy.  On  the  basis  of  contempo 
rary  accounts  in  the  press,  Ramey  and  Shapiro  (1998)  identified  three In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  173 
episodes  of  expansionary  defense  spending  that  could  reasonably  be  in 
terpreted  as  exogenous  and  unforeseen:  the Korean  War,  the Vietnam 
War,  and  the Carter-Reagan  buildup;  following  Eichenbaum  and  Fisher 
(2004)  and  Ramey  (2006),  I add  the Bush  buildup  that  started  at  the  end 
of  2001. 
2.1.1  The  DV1  Methodology  Define  the  Ramey-Shapiro  dummy 
variables  Dlt,  D2t,  D3t,  and  DAt as  taking  the value  of  1 at  the  start  of  each 
of  the Ramey-Shapiro  episodes,  on  1950:3,1965:1,1980:1,  and  2001:4,  re 
spectively.  Define  the  combined  Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  variable  as Dt 
= 
Dlt  +  D2t  +  D3t  +  D,t. 
Let  Xt  be  the  vector  of  endogenous  variables,  whose  first  three  ele 
ments  are  government  spending  gt,  taxes  tt, and  output  yt.  The  first 
version  of  the  dummy  variable  approach  (DV1)  was  introduced  in  a 
univariate  context  by  Ramey  and  Shapiro  (1998)  and  applied  in  a 
multivariate  context  by  Edelberg,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (1999).  It con 
sists  of  estimating  the  reduced-form  VAR 
X, 
= 
A(L)X,_a  +  B(L)Dt  +  Ut  (1) 
where  A(L)  is a polynomial  of  order  nA, B(L)  is a polynomial  of  order  nB 
+  1, and  Ut  is  the vector  of  reduced-form  residuals.  The  typical  effect  of 
these  fiscal  shocks  can  be  found  by  tracing  the  dynamic  effects  of  a unit 
shock  to  the  dummy  variable:  that  is,  the  response  of  the  endogenous 
variables  at  t +  k  is given  by  the  estimated  coefficient  on  Lk in  the  ex 
pansion  of  [I 
- 
A(L)L]"1B(L). 
Outside  these  Ramey-Shapiro  episodes,  the  dynamic  response  of  the 
economy  to  a  shock  to government  spending  is governed  by  the  poly 
nomial  [I 
- 
A(L)L]_1;  thus  the  response  to a  shock  to  the Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy  variable  represents  the  typical  deviation  of  the  economy  from 
its normal  behavior  when  a Ramey-Shapiro  episode  occurs.  Because  the 
dummy  variable  appears  in all  equations  of  the  system,  this methodol 
ogy  assumes  that  during  a Ramey-Shapiro  episode  not  only  the  fiscal 
variables  deviate  from  normal,  but  also  that  the dynamic  response  of  all 
variables  to  the  fiscal  variables  can  change. 
2.1.2  The  DV2  Methodology  The  DV1  approach  imposes  a  strong 
restriction  on  the  data:  the  shape  and  size  of  the  responses  of  all  vari 
ables  to  the  shock  are  the  same  in  each  Ramey-Shapiro  episode.  A  less 
stringent  version  of  this  approach  (introduced  by  Burnside,  Eichen 
baum,  and  Fisher  (2004)  consists  in allowing  each  episode  to have  a dif 174  Perotti 
ferent  intensity,  although  the  shape  of  the  responses  is  still  assumed  to 
be  the  same.  In this DV2  variant  of  the  approach,  one  estimates  the VAR: 
X, 
= 
A(L)Xt_, + X  B(L)8A  + Ut, (2) 
!  = 1 
where  92 
=  1 and  92,  63,  64 are  scalars  that measure  the  intensity  of  the 
last  three  Ramey-Shapiro  episodes  relative  to  the Korean  War. 
2.1.3  The  DV3  Methodology  The  DV2  methodology  still  imposes 
the  constraint  that  the  shapes  of  the  responses  of  a given  variable  must 
be  the  same  in each  episode.  However,  each  episode  might  consist  of dif 
ferent  policies,  like  a  tax  cut  in one  episode  and  a  tax  increase  in another. 
Table  3.1  lists  all  the quarters  in  the  sample  when  the percentage  change 
in  government  spending  or  the  change  in  the  Barro-Shasakul  average 
marginal  income  tax  rate  on  labor  income  exceeded  two  standard  devi 
ations.6  It is clear  that  each  episode  had  its own  specific  fiscal  action.  For 
instance,  taxes  increased  repeatedly  during  the  Korean  War,  in  1950, 
1951,  and  1952,  while  the Vietnam  War  was  accompanied  by  tax  cuts. 
Building  on  Fatas  and Mihov  (2001),  who  point  out  the  differences  be 
tween  the  individual  Ramey-Shapiro  episodes,  in  the DV3  variant  I al 
low  the  responses  to each  Ramey-Shapiro  episode  to have  a different  in 
tensity  and  shape: 
Table  3.1 
Large  Changes  in Fiscal  Variables  in  the United  States 
Standard  deviation  of  Ag 
-  0.02  Standard  deviation  of  At  ?  0.55 
I Ag  I  I  Ag I  I  At\  I At  I  ?  >3  2<  ?  <3  ?  >3  2<  ?  <3 
I sd  I  \ sd  \  \ sd  \  \ sd  \ 
50:4  0.08  48:2  0.04  48:1  -3.2  50:1  1.2 
51:1  0.09  50:3  -0.04  51:1  3.3  68:1  1.6 
51:2  0.11  52:2  0.04  52:1  1.7  70:1  -1.3 
51:3  0.10  54:1  -0.05  54:1  -2.4  83:1  -1.6 
54:2  -0.04  64:1  -2.3  02:1  -1.2 
67:1  0.04  78:1  2.1  03:1  -1.3 
79:1  -1.8 
81:1  2.4 
82:1  -1.8 
Note:  gt 
= 
log  of  government  spending  on  goods  and  services,  excluding  nondefense  cap 
ital  spending.  T  = 
average  marginal  income  tax  rate  on  labor  income. In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  175 
X^AiQX^  + j^B^D. 
+ U,,  (3) 
where  each  B.(L)  is an  nB +  1-order  vector  polynomial. 
2.1.4  The  Modified  DV  Methodology  Quite  apart  from  the possible 
loss  of  precision  in  estimation,  the DV3  approach  suffers  from  an  ex 
treme  version  of  a problem  already  present  in  the DV1  and  DV2  ap 
proaches:  since  each  dummy  appears  separately  in  all  equations,  the 
residuals  of  each  equation  at  the  onset  of  each  Ramey-Shapiro  event  and 
during  the  following  nB quarters  are  set  to  zero;  In  other  words,  the 
method  assumes  that  the  abnormal  fiscal  events  are  entirely  responsible 
for  all  the deviation  from  normal  of  all variables  for nB +  1 quarters. 
But  the  logic  of  the method  is  that we  learn  from  the Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes  because  they  are  exogenous  and  big,  thus  highly  informative 
on  the working  of  fiscal  policy,  not  because  the  economy  behaves  differ 
ently  in  some  fundamental  way.7  Thus,  a better  interpretation  of  this 
logic  consists  in  isolating  the  abnormal  fiscal  events  and  estimating  the 
normal  dynamic  response  of  the  nonfiscal  endogenous  variables  to 
these  events. 
This  interpretation  can  be  formalized  by  including  lags  0  to nB of  the 
dummy  variables  in  the  government  spending  and  tax  equations,  and 
only  lag  0  in  the  other  equations.  This  can  be  done  for  the  combined 
dummy  variable  (thus  obtaining  the modified  DV1  and  the modified 
DV2  methods)  or  for  each  Ramey-Shapiro  variable  (the modified  DV3 
approach).  In  these  specifications,  after  the  impact  effect  the behavior  of 
the  nonfiscal  variables  is  explained  by  their  normal  dynamics  in  re 
sponse  to  the  deviations  from  normal  of  the  fiscal  variables. 
2.2  The  SVAR Approach 
The  SVAR  approach  starts  from  the  reduced  form  specification: 
Xt 
= 
A{L)Xt_^Ut,  (4) 
where  Xt  is the vector  of  endogenous  variables;  for  simplicity,  in this  sec 
tion  I assume  that  it consists  of  output  yt, government  spending  gt,  and 
taxes  tt.  The  reduced-form  residuals  of  the gt  and  tt equations,  u\  and  u\, 
can  be  thought  of  as  linear  combinations  of  three  components.  First,  the 
automatic  response  of  government  spending  and  taxes  to  innovations  in 
output,  inflation,  and  the  interest  rate.  Second,  the  systematic  discretion 176  Perotti 
ary  response  of policymakers  to  innovations  in the other  endogenous  vari 
ables;  for  instance,  reductions  in  tax  rates  systematically  implemented 
in response  to  recessions.  Third,  random  discretionary  shocks  to  fiscal  pol 
icies;  these  are  the  structural  fiscal  shocks,  which,  unlike  the  reduced 
form  residuals,  are uncorrelated  with  all  other  structural  shocks.8  This  is 
also  the  component  one  is  interested  in when  estimating  impulse  re 
sponses  to  fiscal  policy  shocks. 
Formally,  and  assuming  for  illustrative  purposes  the  vector  Xt  in 
cludes  only  three  variables,  one  can  posit  the  following  relation  between 
reduced-form  residuals  and  structural  shocks: 
4  = 
<V?  +  (Vf + *\  (5) 
"f 
= 
??,"?+P**!  +  *f/  (6) 
where  the  coefficients  aty  and  a^  capture  the  first  two  components  and 
e\  and  e\  are  the  structural  fiscal  shocks,  with  cov(e\,  e\) 
=  0. Clearly,  e\ 
and  e\ are  correlated  with  the  reduced-form  residuals;  hence,  they  can 
not  be  obtained  by  an  ordinary  least  squared  (OLS)  estimation  of  equa 
tions  (5) and  (6). 
The  key  to  identification  is  the  observation  that  it  typically  takes 
longer  than  a quarter  for discretionary  fiscal  policy  to respond  to,  say,  an 
output  shock;  hence  the  second  component,  the  systematic  discretionary 
response,  is absent  in quarterly  data.  As  a  consequence,  the  coefficients 
aty  and  a^  in equations  (5) and  (6) capture  only  the  automatic  response  of 
fiscal  variables  to economic  activity.  One  can  then  use  available  external 
information  on  the  elasticity  of  taxes  and  spending  to GDP,  inflation, 
and  interest  rates  to compute  the  appropriate  values  of  these  elasticities 
(see  section  3.3),9 with  these,  one  can  then  construct  the  cyclically  ad 
justed  fiscal  shocks: 
ufA 
= 
u\-  atyUy 
= 
ft/f 








+  e*,  (8) 
which  are  linear  combinations  of  the  two  structural  fiscal  policy  shocks. 
The  estimate  of  e \  and  egt  can  be  obtained  by  orthogonalization,  that  is, by 
assuming  $gt 
=  0 or 
$tg 
= 
0;  since  the  correlation  between  u\CA and  ufCA 
is always  very  low,  the  actual  ordering  does  not matter;  as  a benchmark, 
I  will  use  the  first  orthogonalization. 
The  two  structural  shocks  thus  estimated  are  orthogonal  to  the  other 
structural  shocks  of  the  economy,  hence  they  can  be  used  as  instruments 
in  the  remaining  equations:  thus,  one  can  estimate  the GDP  equation  u\ In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  177 
? 
7  t  u\ + 
%xu8t 
+  eVtf  uslng  e* aRd  e\ as  instruments  for  u\ and  uf.  If there 
is another  variable,  like  inflation,  its  residual  is first  subtracted  from  the 
gt  and  tt residuals?using  an  external  elasticity?to  obtain  the  cyclically 
adjusted  fiscal  shocks,  as  in equations  (7) and  (8); then  the  equivalent  of 
the  previous  GDP  equation  for  inflation  can  be  estimated,  adding  u\  to 
the  rhs  and  using  ef,  e\,  and  e\  as  instruments.10  Once  the  structural 
shocks  are  identified,  the  impulse  responses  are  constructed  using  the 
average  elasticities  over  the  relevant  sample  periods. 
2.3  Discussion 
The  advantage  of  the  dummy  variable  approach  is  that  it does  not  re 
quire  any  further  assumption  to  identify  fiscal  shocks.  It  suffers  from 
two  potential  problems.  The  first  is an  extreme  case  of  the  small  sample 
problem:  obviously  the  identifying  assumption  of  the method  is that  the 
dummy  variable  should  be  uncorrelated  with  the  residuals  of  each 
equation  contemporaneously  and  up  to  nB  lags;  but  with  such  a  small 
number  of  episodes  (in  the  case  of  the DV3  method,  just  one  for  each 
polynomial  B.[L]),  how  does  one  know  if  the  Ramey-Shapiro  dummy 
captures  the  onset  of  the Korean  War  or,  say,  the  delayed  effect  of  the 
1948  tax  cut  (according  to  the  classification  of Romer  and  Romer  [2006], 
the  largest  in U.S.  history),  or  other  nonfiscal  shocks? 
A  second  question  is again  well  illustrated  by  the Korean  War  dummy 
variable.  Table  3.1  shows  that  this  episode  consisted  of  a  string  of  large 
increases  in government  spending  starting  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1950, 
raising  the  issue  whether  these  were  anticipated  or  not  as  of  the  begin 
ning  of  the  episode:  does  the  path  of  private  consumption  from  1950:3 
on  represent  the  dynamic  response  to  an  unanticipated,  one-off  wealth 
effect  occurring  in  1950:3,  which  takes  into  account  the whole  increase 
in government  spending  during  the  episode,  or  does  it represent  the  re 
sult  of many  small-wealth  shocks  that  occur  each  quarter  after  1950:3? 
More  generally,  one  can  interpret  the deviation  from  normal  behavior 
following  the onset  of  an  episode  at  time  r0 in two ways:  it could  describe 
the  predictable  typical  deviations  from  normal  after  these  abnormal 
events,  or  it could  capture  a  sequence  of new  fiscal  shocks  after  t0. In the 
former  case,  the  response  of  consumption  at  t0 reflects  the wealth  effect 
caused  by  the  entire  subsequent  path  of  government  spending;  in  the 
latter,  the  response  of  consumption  in each  period  would  reflect  the new 
fiscal  shocks. 
It  will  come  as no  surprise  to anyone  that  the  overall  costs  of wars  are 178  Perotti 
difficult  to predict.  It  is  instructive  to  see  by  how  much.  On  April  22, 
2003,  one  month  after  the  start  of Operation  Iraqi  Freedom,  a Congres 
sional  Research  Service  Report  for Congress  contained  a  range  of  esti 
mates  of  the war  on  Iraq  and  of  the  ensuing  occupation.  The  price  tag on 
a  two-month  war,  plus  the  occupation  for  FY  2003,  ranged  from  $54bn 
to $98.6bn.  The  cost  of  occupation  per  year  was  estimated  at  $45.6bn  for 
200,000  troops.  The  Center  for  Strategic  and  Budgetary  Assessment 
(CSBA)  estimated  the  total  cost  of  a  five-year  occupation  from  $25bn  to 
$105bn.  Although  the  administration  did  not  release  estimates,  the press 
reported  an  administration  estimate  of  $20bn  per  year,  for  two  years. 
Thus,  in April  2003  the  highest  possible  price  tag  for  the  years  2003 
through  2006  that  a  (very)  well-informed  individual  could  have  gath 
ered  from  the debate  was  $98.6bn  +  $45.6bn  X  3 = 
$235.4bn;  and  this  as 
suming  that  there would  still  be  a very  substantial  military  presence  in 
2006?an  event  not many  would  have  considered  likely  at  the  time.  Us 
ing,  for  instance,  the CSBA  median  estimate  would  have  put  the  price 
tag  at  $98.6bn  +  $13bn  X  3 = 
$138.7bn. 
The most  recent  Congressional  Research  Service  Report  on  the war,  is 
sued  September  22,  2006,  estimates  cumulated  appropriations  through 
2006,  of which  $287.6bn  for Department  of Defense  (DoD)  alone.  In 2005, 
the  average  troop  level  in Iraq was  202,000,  yet  the DoD  obligations  were 
$70.9bn,  against  the  $45.6bn  predicted  in 2003  for  an  occupation  force  of 
200,000  troops.  The  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)  now  estimates 
that  the  cumulative  cost  of  the  global  war  on  terror  will  be  $634bn  in 
2010  and  $808bn  in 2016.  It is hard  to believe  that  the 2001:4  dummy  cap 
tures  anything  remotely  close  to a wealth  effect  of  $808bn.n 
The  key  question  of  the SVAR  approach  concerns  the predictability  of 
its estimated  shocks.  While  decision  lags  help  identify  the  fiscal  shocks, 
implementation  lags  could  cause  the  latter  to  be  anticipated  by  the 
private  sector;  the  resulting  impulse  responses  would  be  biased.  This  is 
a  legitimate  and  important  concern.  Suppose  that  the data  are  generated 
by  the neoclassical  model  with  lump-sum  taxation,  but  the  government 
spending  shocks  estimated  by  the  econometrician  are  in  reality  antici 
pated  by  the  private  sector  by  one  period;  as Ramey  (2006)  shows,  the 
econometrician  will  find  a positive  response  of  consumption  to her  esti 
mated  government  spending  shock.  The  intuition  is  simple:  in  the neo 
classical  model,  at  the  time  the  true  temporary  shock  consumption  falls 
on  impact,  to  return  back  to  the  steady  state  slowly  as  capital  accumu 
lates;  the  econometrician  would  then  just  capture  the  increasing  part  of 
the  consumption  path,  after  the  impact  effect.  The  first  panel  of  figure In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  179 
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Figure  3.1 
The  Effects  of Missing  the  Timing  with  and  without  Habit  Formation 
3.1, which  replicates  a  figure  in Ramey  (2006),  displays  the  true  and  es 
timated  responses  of  consumption  to a government  spending  shock  that 
is announced  one  quarter  in advance,  in a  simple  model  like  Baxter  and 
King  (1993) with  a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  and  utility  of  the 
form  Ut 
= 
log(Q)  +  log(500 
- 
Ht)  where  H  is quarterly  hours. 
The  same  intuition  suggests,  however,  that with  habit  persistence  in 
consumption  the model  would  still  exhibit  a negative  consumption  re 




7Q_a)  +  log  (500 
- 
Ht)  where  7 
=  .  65,  as  in Christiano,  Eichen 
baum,  and  Evans  (2005).  Now  the  estimated  response  still  exhibits  a 
decline  in  consumption.  Of  course,  if  the  shock  were  anticipated  by 
more  than  one  quarter  the  estimated  decline  in consumption  would  be 
smaller. 
Ultimately,  how  much  the  estimated  SVAR  fiscal  shocks  are  antici 
pated  and  how  much  this matters  is  an  empirical  question.  I  will  pro 
vide  some  clues  in  section  3.4.3,  after  presenting  the  evidence  from  the 
dummy  variable  (DV)  and  SVAR  approaches.  Note,  however,  that  the 180  Perotti 
same  issue  arises  in  the  DV  approach.  Strictly  speaking,  the  Ramey 
Shapiro  dummy  variables  should  capture  the moment  the wealth  effect 
manifests  itself,  that  is,  the  quarter  in which  a  future  military  buildup 
becomes  common  knowledge.  Assuming  such  a date  can  be  defined,  it 
is certainly  easy  for  the  econometrician  to  miss  its  timing  by  one  or  two 
quarters;  and  indeed,  as  discussed  previously,  there  might  not  be  a 
unique  such  shock. 
3  The  Data  and  Specifications 
The  benchmark  specification  of  the  VAR  consists  of  seven  variables: 
government  spending  on  goods  and  services  gt,  the  Barro-Sahasakul 
average  marginal  income  tax  rate  tt, real GDP  yt,  private  consumption 
on  nondurables  and  services  ct, private  gross  fixed  capital  formation  kt 
(except  for  tt, all  in  log  of  real,  per  capita  values),  the  log  of  hours  per 
capita  in  the nonfarm  business  sector  et. and  the  log  of  the  real  product 
hourly  compensation  in  the  nonfarm  business  sector  wt.  In  alternative 
specifications,  the  two  labor market  variables  are  replaced  by  the GDP 
deflator  inflation  rate  tt, and  the  three-month  nominal  interest  rate  it; in 
yet  a different  specification,  tt is represented  by  the  log  of  real  per  capita 
net  taxes.121  also  experiment  with  a  smaller,  four-variable  VAR  that  in 
cludes  gt,yt,ct,  and  kt. 
The  average  marginal  income  tax  rate  is  the  same  variable  used  by 
Edelberg,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (1999)  and  Burnside,  Eichenbaum, 
and  Fisher  (2004),  and  proxies  for  the  distortionary  effects  of  taxation; 
net  taxes,  used  by  Blanchard  and  Perotti  (2002),  capture  the net  flow  of 
resources  from  the  private  sector  to  the  government?an  important 
variable  in a  model  with  credit  constraints.  The  interest  rate  controls  for 
monetary  policy.  The  small  VAR  is  meant  to  facilitate  comparisons  with 
historical  SVARs  with  annual  data,  which,  because  of  the  smaller  sample 
size,  will  be  based  on  this  specification.  In general,  all  these  alternative 
specifications  generate  nearly  identical  results,  hence  I  will  focus  on  the 
benchmark  seven-variable  specification. 
An  important  recent  debate  has  focused  on  the  robustness  of  SVARs 
estimates  of  the  effects  of  technology  shocks,  depending  on  the method 
used  to  induce  stationarity  I  will  discuss  all  results  from  two  alternative 
variants  of  the previous  specifications,  with  a constant  and  a  linear  trend 
(LT specification),  and with  all variables  in first  differences  (II specifica 
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Each  equation  includes  four  lags  of  the  endogenous  variables;  the 
Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  variables  are  entered  with  lags  0  to 6. 
All  fiscal  variables  are  defined  at  the  level  of  the  general  government 
(in  the United  States  this  consists  of  the  federal,  state,  and  local  govern 
ments,  plus  social  security  funds).  Government  spending  on  goods 
and  services  includes  government  consumption  plus  defense  invest 
ment  in machinery  and  equipment.13  Private  consumption  includes 
nondurables  and  services  and  private  investment  does  not  include  the 
change  in  inventories.  The  sample  starts  in 1947:1  and  ends  in 2003:4  (the 
binding  constraint  is  the  average  marginal  income  tax  rate,  that  at 
the  time  the  paper  was  written  could  only  be  constructed  up  to 2003:4; 
the  other  variables  were  available  up  to 2006:2).  Appendix  A  (available 
on  the  author's  web  site)  describes  the  data  in greater  detail. 
The  elasticities  of  government  revenues  are  constructed  from  the  an 
nual  elasticities  computed  by  Giorno,  Richardson,  Roseveare  and  Van 
den  Noord  (1995)  and  updated  by  Van  den  Noord  (2002),  based  on  the 
actual  tax  codes  and  the  distribution  of  incomes  across  households; 
these  have  been  adjusted  to  convert  them  into  quarterly  elasticities  and 
to  take  into  account  possible  collection  lags.14 Appendix  B  (available  on 
the  author's  web  site)  describes  the  construction  of  the  tax  elasticities. 
Note  that  the Barro-Shasakul  average  marginal  income  tax  rate  is a pol 
icy  variable;  hence  by  assumption  it does  not  respond  to  shocks  to  the 
nonfiscal  endogenous  variables  within  a given  quarter;  thus,  in  specifi 
cations  that  use  this  variable,  government  spending  shocks  are  identi 
fied  via  a  simple  Choleski  ordering.15 
4  Output  and  Its Components 
4.1  The DV  Approach 
Figure  3.2 begins  with  the DV1  and DV3  approaches  on  each  column  (re 
sults  from  the DV2  approach  are  nearly  identical  to  those  from  the DV1 
approach,  and  everything  I  will  say  about  the DV1  approach  also  ap 
plies  to  the  DV2  approach).  It displays  the  responses  of  government 
spending,  the  average  marginal  income  tax  rate,  GDP,  private  con 
sumption,  and  private  investment,  from  the benchmark  seven-variable 
VAR.  All  equations  contain  a  constant  and  a  linear  trend.  All  endoge 
nous  variables  are  entered  with  four  lags;  the Ramey-Shapiro  dummy 
variables  with  lags  0  to 6. The  first  five  rows  display  the  responses  in  the 182  Perotti 
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Figure  3.2 
Responses  to Ramey-Shapiro  Dummy  Variables 
DV1  approach  and  in  the  individual  episodes  of  the DV3  approach:  the 
next  five  rows  display  the  responses  in  the modified  DV1  and  DV3  ap 
proaches.  Each  panel  displays  the  point  estimate  of  the  variable  indi 
cated  on  the  row,  with  the  16th  and  84th  percentiles  of  the  responses 
based  on  500 Monte  Carlo  simulations  (on  bootstrapping  in  the modi 
fied DV  approaches).  The  responses  of  government  spending,  consump 
tion,  and  investment  are  expressed  in percentage  points  of GDP  by multi 
plying  the  log  response  by  one  hundred  times  the  average  share  of  each 
variable  in GDP. 
The  Korean  War  is by  far  the  largest  episode  in  terms  of  government 
spending,  with  a peak  increase  after  two  years  of  almost  7 percent  of In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  183 
GDP  above  trend,  followed  by  the Vietnam  War,  with  a peak  of  1.5 per 
cent  after  the  same  interval.  The  other  two  episodes  exhibit  no  increase 
in government  spending  (the military  expansion  was  compensated  by  a 
reduction  in civilian  spending  of  the  same  size). 
It  is  well  known  that,  largely  due  to  an  ideological  aversion  of  Presi 
dent  Truman  to budget  deficits,  the Korean  War  buildup  was  mostly  fi 
nanced  with  taxes:  in  fact,  row  2  shows  that  the  average  marginal  tax 
rate  on  labor  increases  by  3 percentage  points  above  trend  six  quarters 
after  the  start  of  the  episode.  The  tax  rate  increased  also, with  a  lag,  in  the 
Reagan  buildup,16  while  it fell  in  the Vietnam  and  Bush  buildups. 
Output  increases  in  the DV1  approach  and  also  in  the  Korean  and 
Vietnam  wars;  it falls  in  the Reagan  and  Bush  buildups.  In  the  two  quar 
ters  after  the  start  of  the  Reagan  buildup,  quarterly  GDP  growth  was 
-7.8  and  -.7  percent,  then  recovered  to  7.6  and  8.4  percent,  then  fell  to 
negative  values  for  another  six  quarters;  this  pattern  is captured  clearly 
by  the GDP  response  in  the DV3  approach,  since  the  latter  attributes  all 
the  residual  of  the GDP  regression  to  the buildup.  A  similar  story  holds 
for  the Bush  buildup,  which  displays  a  large  recession  immediately  after 
its onset  despite  a flat  government  spending  response  and  a  tax  cut:  the 
unmodified  DV3  approach  attributes  all  of  it  to  the Ramey-Shapiro  fis 
cal  shock. 
In  the DV1  approach,  consumption  declines  significantly,  by  almost  1 
percent  of  GDP  after  six  quarters.  This  result  is  similar  to  Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (1999), who,  however,  find  a  more  modest  and 
insignificant  decline.  Thus,  the DV1  approach  shows  rising  output  and 
declining  consumption,  the  typical  neoclassical  pattern  after  a govern 
ment  spending  shock.  However,  when  one  separates  the  four  episodes 
in  the DV3  approach,  it becomes  clear  that,  because  of  the  constraints  it 
imposes,  the DV1  approach  cannot  capture  the  typical  patterns  of  co 
movements  between  government  spending  and  GDP  on  one  hand,  and 
consumption  on  the  other,  that  occur  in  the  individual  episodes.  Except 
for Korea,  where  consumption  is flat,  in  the  other  episodes  the  response 
of  consumption  has  the  same  sign  and  even  the  same  shape  as  that  of 
GDP.  The  DV1  approach  captures  mostly  the  large  increases  in govern 
ment  spending  and  GDP  in  the  first  two  episodes,  and  the  large  decline 
in  consumption  in  the  last  two.  Similarly,  in  the DV1  approach  private 
investment  (row  5)  falls;  but  among  the  individual  episodes,  it is only  in 
Korea  that  investment  moves  in  the  opposite  direction  to GDP;  in  the 
others,  it  closely  follows  the GDP  response.  Estimation  in  first  differ 
ences  generates  the  same  results  (not  shown). 184  Perotti 
The  last  five  rows  display  the  responses  of  the  same  variables  in  the 
modified  DV1  and  DV3  approaches.  In  contrast  to  the DV3  method  in 
row  3,  the modified  method  in row  8 does  not  attribute  all  the  large  post 
Vietnam  expansion  to  the Ramey-Shapiro  episodes,  but  only  the normal 
GDP  response  (taking  into  account  possibly  different  patterns  of  the  tax 
rate  response  in  the  various  episodes).  Note  also  that  now  the method 
ology  does  not  attribute  the  recession  of  1982  to  the Bush  fiscal  episode; 
hence  GDP  rises  above  trend:  one  possible  reason  is  the  tax  cut  that  ac 
companied  this  episode.17  But  GDP  still  falls  in  response  to  the Reagan 
episode:  government  spending  is flat,  but  the  tax  rate  increases. 
Now  consumption  rises  significantly  above  trend,  even  during  the 
Korean  War;  thus,  it increases  in all  episodes  except  the Reagan  buildup, 
when  GDP  fell. Hence,  in  the modified  approach  the  consumption  re 
sponse  has  the  same  sign  as  the GDP  in  the DV1  approach,  and  in all  in 
dividual  episodes. 
Conditional  on  a Ramey-Shapiro  shock,  the  response  of  investment 
also mostly  reflects  that  of GDP  in  the modified  DV  approaches,  too. 
4.2  The  SVAR Approach 
Figure  3.3  displays  impulse  responses  from  the  SVAR  approach.  The 
shock  to government  spending  is normalized  to  1 percentage  point  of 
GDP. 
In  the  first  column,  each  equation  in  the VAR  includes  a  linear  trend, 
and  the  sample  starts  in  1947:1.  Both  GDP  and  consumption  exhibit  a 
hump-shaped  response,  with  peaks  of  about  1.2  and  .4 percentage 
points  of GDP,  respectively,  after  about  two  years.  Thus,  the  SVAR  evi 
dence  on  consumption  appears  consistent  with  the DV3  evidence:  con 
ditional  on  a government  spending  shock,  the  response  of  consumption 
largely  mimics  that  of GDP. 
Quantitatively,  however,  in this  sample  the SVAR  approach  delivers  a 
small  response  of  consumption.  Not  surprisingly,  it  turns  out  that  this 
depends  strongly  on  the  role  of  the Korean  War.  When  the  sample  omits 
the  fiscally  turbulent  late  1940s  and  early  1950s  and  starts  in  1954:1  (col 
umn  2),  the positive  response  of  consumption  rises  to a peak  of  about  .9 
percent  of GDP  after  three  years.18  This  is consistent  with  the  evidence 
from  the DV  approach,  since  the  sample  now  omits  the Korean  War  with 
its  large  increases  in government  spending  and  in the  tax  rate.  In fact,  the 
tax  rate  rises  in  the  long  sample,  and  it  is flat  in  the  shorter  sample. 
In the  II specification,  the  results  are  similar:  a small  positive  response In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  185 
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Figure  3.3 
SVAR  Responses  to Government  Spending  Shocks 
of GDP  and  private  consumption  in  the  longer  sample,  and  a  larger  and 
significant  response  in the  shorter  sample;  the peak  effects,  however,  are 
smaller  than  in  the  LT  specification. 
Investment  falls,  typically  by  between  .4 and  .8 percentage  points  of 
GDP.  This  is due  in almost  equal  parts  to  machinery  and  equipment  and 
to  residential  investment;  investment  in  structures  is flat.19 All  these  re 
sults  extend  to  the  II  specification. 
4.3  Predictability  of  the  SVAR  Fiscal  Shocks 
Are  the  SVAR  government  spending  shocks  predictable? 
Following  Ramey  (2006),  a  first  obvious  candidate  as  a predictor  is the 
Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  variable  itself.  The  first  row  of  table  3.2  shows 
that,  like  in Ramey  (2006),  over  the  full  sample  starting  in  1947:1  the 186  Perotti 
Table  3.2 
Forecastability  of  R-S  Dummy  and  SVAR  Shocks 
Full  Short 
sample  sample 
1  OLS:  SVAR  g  shock  on  4  lags  of  the R-S  combined  dummy  0.03  0.85 
2  OLS:  SVAR  g  shock  on  4  lags  of  each  R-S  dummy  0.00  0.52 
3  OLS:  Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  on  4  lags  of  g,  t, and  y  shock  0.02  0.01 
4  Probit:  Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  on  4  lags  of  g,  t, and  y  shock  0.58 
Notes:  In  rows  1  to  3,  the  last  two  columns  display  the  p-value  of  a  test  of  the  exclusion  of 
all  regressors  in  the  equation.  In  row  4,  the  second-to-last  column  indicates  the  probabil 
ity  of  1950:3.  Full  sample 
=  1947:1-2003:4:  Short  sample 
=  1954:1-2003:4. 
combined  Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  Granger  causes  the  government 
spending  SVAR  shock;  the next  row  shows  that  the  individual  dummies 
are  even  more  (jointly)  significant  in  predicting  the  SVAR  spending 
shock.  However,  row  3  shows  that  in a OLS  regression,  the  lagged  gov 
ernment  spending,  tax,  and  GDP  shocks  also  predict  the Ramey-Shapiro 
combined  dummy,  with  a  p-value  of  2 percent.20  As  Leeper  (1997)  ar 
gues,  a probit  regression  may  be more  appropriate  than  a  linear  one  to 
predict  a dummy  variable;  in  this  case,  the  lagged  SVAR  shocks  are  no 
longer  jointly  significant  in predicting  the Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  (not 
shown);  however,  the  regression  predicts  the  Korean  event  of  1950:3 
with  a probability  of  58 percent  (row  4). 
A  further  examination  of  the OLS  prediction  equations  for  the  gov 
ernment  spending  shock  in rows  1 and  2 also  reveals  that  the predictive 
power  of  the  Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  comes  mostly  from  the  Korean 
War  (by  far  the  largest  of  all  the  episodes):  the  last  column  of  table  3.2 
shows  that  over  the  shorter  sample,  starting  in 1954:1,  the  four  lags  of  the 
Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  (or  dummies)  do  not  help  predict  the  SVAR 
shocks.  However,  the  SVAR  shocks  still  predict  the  Ramey-Shapiro 
dummy,  with  a p-value  of  .01. 
A  second  candidate  to assess  the predictability  of  the  estimated  SVAR 
shocks  is  independent  assessments  of  the  fiscal  stance.  Since  1984,  the 
Congressional  Budget  Office  publishes,  in The  Economic  and Budget  Out 
look  (usually  in February-March  and  August-September),  revisions  of 
changes  of  government  spending  and  revenues  during  the  year  of  the 
forecast,  and  up  to  five  years  thereafter,  relative  to  the  previous  fore 
casts.21  These  changes  are  divided  in  three  categories:  technical,  legisla 
tive,  and  economic  (the  latter  are  those  that  are due  to changes  in the  eco 
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Table  3.3 
Forecastability  of  SVAR  Shocks  Using  CBO  Revisions 
OLS  regression  of  SVAR  g  shock  Full  Short 
on  CBO  forecasts  sample  sample 
1  SVAR shock on  lagged CBO 
forecast  revisions  0.62  .21 
2  SVAR  shock  on  contemporary  CBO 
forecast  revisions  0.15  .05 
Notes:  The  last  two  columns  display  the  p-value  of  a  test  of  the  exclusion  of  the  regressor 
in  the  equation.  Full  sample 
=  1947:1-2003:4:  Short  sample 
=  1954:1-2003:4.  The  fiscal 
shocks  are  obtained  from  quarterly  VARs  estimated  over  these  two  samples.  The  p-values 
are  obtained  from  a  regression  of  these  fiscal  shocks  on  the CBO  forecast,  over  the  sample 
starting  in  the  first  semester  of  1984:1. 
In row  1 of  table  3.31  take  the  average  of  the SVAR  government  spend 
ing  shock  (estimated  over  the  1954:1-2003:4  sample,  and  expressed  as 
share  of GDP  by multiplication  by  the  average  spending/GDP  ratio)  in 
the  first  and  second  quarters  and  in  the  third  and  fourth  quarters  of year 
t, and  regress  this  half-yearly  variable  on  the  sum  of  the  legislative  and 
technical  CBO  forecast  revisions  (normalized  by  potential  output)  for 
year  t,  made  in  the previous  semester.  In both  samples,  the  coefficient  of 
the CBO  forecast  is  insignificant.22 
Thus,  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  SVAR  shocks  are  predictable? 
but  do  they  make  sense?  When  the  half-yearly  SVAR  government 
spending  shock  is  regressed  not  on  the  lagged  value,  but  on  the  con 
temporaneous  value  of  the  sum  of  the  CBO  legislative  and  technical 
forecast  revisions,  the  p-value  is  .15  in  the  long  sample  and  .05  in  the 
short  sample  (row  2 of  table  3.3).  Thus,  the  data  suggest  that  the  SVAR 
government  spending  shocks  estimated  over  the  shorter  sample  are 
contemporaneously  correlated  with  the  information  contained  in  the 
CBO  forecasts. 
5  Explaining  the Difference  in  the Ramey-Shapiro  Episodes 
Besides  the  change  in  total  government  spending,  fiscal  policies  during 
the  four  Ramey-Shapiro  episodes  differed  markedly  both  in  terms  of 
the  accompanying  tax policies  and  in  terms  of  the  composition  of  gov 
ernment  spending.  The  DV3  approach,  in  both  its  unmodified  and 
modified  versions,  already  provided  some  evidence  for  the  role  of  the 
tax  response  in  shaping  the GDP  and  consumption  responses.  Further 
evidence  can  be  provided  by  historical  decompositions. 188  Perotti 
5.1  The  Role  of Taxes 
Figures  3.4  and  3.5  display  historical  decompositions  of  consumption  in 
the  four  episodes.23  For  each  episode,  two  series  are  displayed.  First,  the 
deviation  from  the  actual  consumption  path  of  the  consumption  fore 
cast,  based  on  information  up  to  the  start  of  the  episode  plus  the  se 
quence  of  government  spending  shocks  during  the  five  years  of  the  fore 
cast  horizon  ("g_shocks").  This  variable  describes  what  the  deviation 
from  the  actual  consumption  would  have  been  if only  the  SVAR  gov 
ernment  spending  shocks  had  occurred  after  the  beginning  of  each 
episode.  Second,  the  deviation  of  the  consumption  forecast  from  the  ac 
tual  consumption  path,  based  on  the  sequence  of  net  tax  shocks  only 
("t_shocks"),  constructed  in a  similar  manner.  Both  series  are  expressed 
as  shares  of GDP  by  multiplying  the  log  response  by  the  average  con 
sumption/GDP  ratio. 
The  first  panel  is based  on  the VAR  estimated  over  the  long  sample, 
starting  in  1947:1.  Except  in  the Reagan  buildup,  government  spending 
shocks  make  a  positive  contribution  to  consumption,  and  were  only 
slightly  larger  in  the Korean  War  than  in  the Vietnam  War  or  the  Bush 
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buildup.  Tax  shocks  make  a negative  contribution  in  the  Korean  War 
and  the Reagan  buildup,  when  taxes  increased,  and  a positive  contribu 
tion  in the Vietnam  and  Bush  buildups,  when  taxes  fell. The  contribution 
of  tax  shocks  is  generally  smaller  than  that  of  government  spending 
shocks. 
The  second  panel  is based  on  the  shorter  sample.  The  estimated  con 
tribution  of  government  spending  shocks  in  the Vietnam  War  increases 
considerably,  to  about  1.5  percent  of  GDP.  In  fact,  the  contribution  of 
government  spending  by  itself  accounts  for  all  the  deviation  of  con 
sumption  from  trend  estimated  by  the  DV3  approach  during  this 
episode. 
5.2  The  Composition  of Government  Spending 
The  composition  of  the  government  spending  changes  in  the  four 
episodes  was  also  different.  Figure  3.6  displays  impulse  responses  to  the 
Ramey-Shapiro  dummy  variables,  from  the  benchmark  VAR,  where 
government  spending  has  been  split  into  its  defense  and  nondefense 190  Perotti 
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Figure  3.6 
Response  of  Civilian  and  Defense  Spending  to Ramey-Shapiro  Dummy  Variables 
components.  The  first  row  displays  the  response  of  civilian  spending, 
the  second  displays  defense  spending,  and  the  third  displays  their  sum, 
total  government  spending.  In all  episodes,  defense  spending  increases, 
and,  except  in Vietnam,  civilian  spending  falls;  and  in  the Reagan  and 
Bush  buildups,  the  change  in  civilian  spending  is almost  the  same  size 
(in  absolute  value)  as  the  change  in defense  spending,  explaining  the 
limited  change  in  total  government  spending. 
In  a  SVAR,  one  must  distinguish  between  shocks  to  defense  and  to 
civilian  government  spending.  Columns  1 and  2 of  figure  3.7  display  re 
sponses  to a civilian  and  defense  spending  shock,  respectively,  from  the 
same  eight-variable  VAR  with  civilian  and  defense  spending  instead  of 
total  government  spending.  In both  columns  the  initial  shock  is  renor 
malized  so  that  total  government  spending  increases  by  1 percent  of 
GDP.  To derive  the  responses,  civilian  spending  is ordered  before  defense 
spending,  but  the opposite  ordering  produces  nearly  identical  results. 
The  response  of  total  government  spending  to a civilian  shock  is  much 
more  intensive  in civilian  expenditure,  but  it is also much  less persistent; 
however,  the  positive  response  of  consumption  to  a  civilian  spending In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  191 
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shock  is much  larger?more  than  1 percent  of  GDP  after  two  years, 
against  .5  percentage  points  after  a defense  shock.  The  same  considera 
tions  also  hold  in  the  II  specification  (columns  3 and  4);  in  fact,  now  the 
difference  in  the persistence  of  total  government  spending  after  the  two 
shocks  is  larger,  yet  so  is  the  difference  in  the  response  of  consumption. 
In  response  to a defense  spending  shock,  investment  (row  6)  always 
falls, while  in response  to a civilian  shock  it rises  in  the LT  specification, 
and  it is basically  flat  in  the  II  specification. 
Thus,  the  evidence  from  the  SVAR  approach  is  that  civilian  govern 
ment  spending  shocks  appear  to be  associated  with  stronger  responses 
of GDP  and  its components,  and  that  this  played  a  role  in explaining  the 
differences  between  Ramey-Shapiro  episodes. 
6  Evidence  from  Long-Run  Annual  Data 
To  overcome  the  problems  of  both  the DV  and  the  SVAR  approaches, 
Ramey  (2006)  advocates  estimating  an  SVAR  with  annual  data.  The  DV 192  Perotti 
approach  is based  on  very  few  episodes  with  different  features;  this  can 
be  mitigated  by  the  longer  sample  available  with  annual  data.  And  if 
changes  in government  spending  are mostly  anticipated  by  one  or  two 
quarters,  then  the  estimated  shocks  have  a better  chance  to be  unantici 
pated  (based  on  an  information  set  of  yearly  variables). 
But  against  this  are  two  disadvantages.  First,  the  SVAR  approach  to 
identification  hinges  on  decision  lags  in  fiscal  policy:  by  and  large,  gov 
ernment  spending  on  goods  and  services  does  not  respond  to macro 
economic  news  within  a  quarter.  This  identifying  assumption  is  less 
plausible  with  annual  data,  but  then,  if government  spending  is used  as 
a  countercyclical  tool,  it  is  likely  to  impart  a negative  bias  to  the  esti 
mated  response  of  consumption.  Second,  the quality  of national  account 
data  deteriorates  quickly  as one moves  backward  in time,  and  this  prob 
lem  is particularly  severe  for  the  key  variable,  government  spending. 
Official  U.S.  annual  national  account  data  are  available  starting  in 
1929  from  the Department  of Commerce;  between  1889  and  1929,  annual 
data  have  been  estimated  by  Kuznets  and  revised  by  Kendrick.  Aside 
from  a  few  amendments  to make  Kuznets'  series  more  consistent  with 
the Department  of Commerce  definitions,  used  from  1929  onward,  for 
the purposes  of  this  paper  a  major  contribution  of Kendrick's  work  con 
sists  in adding  an  estimate  of  government  spending  on  goods  and  ser 
vices.  However,  one  should  be  aware  of  a few  problems  with  this  series. 
For  instance,  between  1890  and  1902,  state  and  local  purchases,  other 
than  compensation  of  public  school  employees  and  new  construction, 
are  interpolated  by  a  straight  line;  and  straight-line  interpolation  (albeit 
at  shorter  intervals)  is frequent  for  several  other  items.  Also,  as Kendrick 
acknowledges,  the  estimates  of  the  government  spending  deflators  are 
often  speculative.24 
With  this  in mind,  figure  3.8  displays  responses  from  a  small,  five 
variable  VAR  that  includes  government  spending,  GDP  in  the business 
sector,25  total  private  consumption,26  full-time-equivalent  employment 
in  the business  sector,  and wage  and  salary  accruals  per  full-time  equiv 
alent  employee  in  the  business  sector.  This  last  variable  starts  in  1929, 
the  others  in  1889;  hence,  when  estimated  over  the  longer  sample,  the 
system  consists  of  the  first  four  variables  only  (also,  employment  is not 
in  full-time  equivalent  terms  in  this  case).  As  usual,  the  system  is esti 
mated  in  levels  with  a  constant  and  a  time  trend,  or  in  first  differences 
with  a  constant. 
This  specification  is similar  to  that  of Ramey  (2006)  and,  like  there,  the 
response  of  consumption  initially  drops  slightly  but  significantly,  by  a 1889,  LT  1929,  LT  1929,  no  wars,  LT  1929  no  wars,  LT  1889,  11  1929,  11  1929,  no  wars,  11  1929  no  wars,  11 
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similar  amount  to Ramey  (2006),  less  than  .2  percentage  points  of GDP.  If 
one  excludes  the  years  1941-1947  (not  shown),  the  initial  drop  remains, 
but  then  consumption  rises  slightly  (but  significantly)  above  trend. 
However,  these  results  depend  heavily  on  the  first part  of  the  sample. 
If one  estimates  the  same  SVAR  starting  in  1929  (column  2),  thus  using 
only  the  BEA  data  based  on  a  consistent  definition  and  no  interpola 
tions,  just  like  in  the  quarterly  SVAR  the  response  of  private  consump 
tion  of nondurables  and  services  follows  closely  that  of GDP  (except  for 
the  initial  jump  in  the  latter,  caused  by  the  jump  in government  spend 
ing):  it still  declines  very  slightly  on  impact,  but  then  increases  to a peak 
of  about  .25 percentage  points  of GDP  above  trend  after  three  years. 
In  this  type  of  investigation,  the  treatment  of WWII  and  the Korean 
War  is crucial.  Government  spending  on  goods  and  services  as  a  share 
of GDP  rose  from  14.8 percent  of GDP  in 1940  to 47.9  percent  in 1944,  and 
from  15.9  percent  of GDP  in  1950  to 23.9  percent  in  1953;  over  the  same 
periods,  private  consumption  of  nondurables  and  services  decreased 
from  62.6  to 46.4  percent  of GDP,  and  from  55  to 52.8  percent  of GDP,  re 
spectively.  As  usual  in  these  cases,  it  is not  obvious  whether  one  wants 
to  treat wars  as  outliers  or  as  episodes  that  contain  a  lot of  useful  infor 
mation;  column  3  shows  that,  if one  does  leave  out  the  years  1941-1945 
and  1950-1953,  the  response  of  consumption  rises  considerably,  to  more 
than  .4  percent  of GDP  after  one  year:  Interestingly,  the  standard  errors 
are  still  quite  small,  and  all  responses  are  still  highly  significant. 
However,  what  is perhaps  even  more  unusual  about  wars  is  the  dra 
matic,  sudden  decline  in government  spending  once  they  are  over:  be 
tween  1944  and  1946,  government  spending  fell  from  47.9  to 17.8 percent 
of GDP,  while  between  1953  and  1955  it  fell  from  23.9  to  20.8  percent; 
consumption  of  nondurables  and  services  increased  from  46.4  to  57.8 
percent  of GDP  after WWII,  while  it remained  at  around  53  percent  af 
ter  the Korean  War.  In fact,  if one  leaves  out  also  the years  1946-1947  and 
1954-1955  (column  4),  the  response  of  private  consumption  about  dou 
bles,  reaching  a peak  of  .8  percentage  points  of GDP  after  one  year:  this 
is very  close  to  the  response  of  the  SVAR  estimated  in quarterly  data 
from  1954:1. 
The  results  in  the  II  specification  (columns  5  to 8)  are  very  similar:  in 
particular, 
one  observes  the  same 
progression  toward  stronger  re 
sponses  of  consumption  as  one  moves  to  the  right  of  the  figure.  Thus, 
once  reliable  data  are  used,  the  historical  SVAR  evidence  on  consump 
tion with  annual  data  delivers  results  that  are very  similar  to  those  of  the 
quarterly  SVARs  and  to  the DV3  approach. In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  195 
Investment,  too,  displays  stronger  responses  as  one  moves  to  the 
right.  In  the  entire  sample  starting  in  1889  the  response  is negative,  and 
remains  so  for  the  first  three  years  if the  sample  starts  in  1929. When  the 
war  and  postwar  periods  are  excluded,  it becomes  positive  and  signifi 
cant.  This  is different  from  the quarterly  SVAR,  where  investment  tends 
to  fall  after  a government  spending  shock.  Thus,  the behavior  of  invest 
ment  is  more  difficult  to pin  down  than  the  response  of  consumption, 
and  is  less  consistent  with  the quarterly  evidence. 
7  The  Labor  Market 
7.1  The  Response  of Hours  and  the Real  Product  Wage 
With  lump-sum  taxation,  virtually  all models  predict  a positive  effect  of 
shocks  to government  spending  on  private  and  total  hours.  However, 
while  the  neoclassical  model  predicts  a decline  in  the  real wage,  some 
neo-Keynesian  models  with  price  stickiness  (like  Gali,  Lopez-Salido, 
and  Valles  (2007)  or  Linnemann  and  Schabert  (2003)27  or  other  reasons 
for  countercyclical  markups  (like  Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1992)  or 
Ravn,  Schmitt-Grohe,  and  Uribe  (2006)  predict  the  opposite. 
It  is  important  to be  clear  on  the  definition  of  the  real wage.  Obvi 
ously,  in a one-sector  model  there  is no  distinction  between  the  real  con 
sumption  wage  and  the  real  product  wage.  But  the  logics  of  the  differ 
ent  predictions  of  the  neoclassical  and  neo-Keynesian  models  also 
survive  with  more  than  one  sector.  In  a neoclassical  model  with  fric 
tions  in  reallocating  capital  between  sectors,  like  Ramey  and  Shapiro 
(1998),  the  sector  that  experiences  the  larger  increase  in government  de 
mand  also  displays  the  larger  fall  in  the product  wage,  as  employment 
shifts  from  one  sector  to  the  other  along  the  sectoral  labor  demand 
curves.  In contrast,  in a  two-sector  neo-Keynesian  model  with  nominal 
price  rigidities  and  some  costs  of  labor  reallocation  across  sectors,  like 
Monacelli  and  Perotti  (2007),  the  sector  that  receives  the  larger  share  of 
the  government  spending  shock  also  exhibits  the  larger  increase  in  the 
real  product  wage,  as  the markup  falls more  in  that  sector.  Thus,  sec 
toral  evidence  can  shed  light  on  the  underlying  transmission  mecha 
nism  for  fiscal  policy. 
Manufacturing  plausibly  receives  a  disproportionate  share  of  the 
shocks  to government  spending  on  goods,  hence  the  importance  of  this 
sector  in  testing  alternative  transmission  mechanisms.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  rise  in  the  real  consumption  wage  is  the  precondition  for 196  Perotti 
private  consumption  to  increase  in neo-Keynesian  models  (see  section 
10), hence  the  importance  of  checking  the  response  of  this  variable,  too. 
Figure  3.9  presents  responses  of  hours  and  various  definitions  of  the 
real wage  from  the  benchmark  seven-variable  specification,  which  in 
cludes  government  spending,  the  average  marginal  income  tax  rate, 
GDP,  consumption,  and  investment,  plus  an  employment  /hour  vari 
able  and  a  wage  variable.  In  the  literature  on  the  effects  of  technological 
shocks,  several  different  employment  and  real  wage  variables  have 
been  used;  as Chari,  Kehoe,  and McGrattan  (2005)  note,  the  results  are 
somewhat  sensitive  to  the variable  used.  I  use  non-farm  business  sector 
hours  per  capita  and  average  weekly  compensation  (deflated  by  the 
value-added  deflator  in  the  non-farm  business  sector),  or manufactur 
ing  hours  per  capita  and  hourly  earnings  (deflated  by  the manufactur 
ing producer  price  index  [PPI]).  I also  experiment  with  private  and  total 
employment  per  capita,  but  these  behave  very  much  like  business  sec 
tor  employment,  hence  I  will  not  report  their  responses.  For  brevity,  I 
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will  refer  to  both  business  sector  compensation  and  manufacturing 
earnings  as  "real  product  wage/'  or  "real wage."  The  first  four  rows  dis 
play  the DV1  and  DV3  approaches,  the  next  four  rows  their modified 
versions. 
In  the DV1  case,  and  in  each  of  the  four  episodes  separately,  the  re 
sponses  of  hours  follow  closely  that  of  GDP.  Only  in  the  Korean  and 
Vietnam  wars  do  hours  increase,  and  they  do  so  in  manufacturing  more 
than  in  the  business  sector.  The  real wage  in  manufacturing  falls  in  the 
Korean  episode  and  increases  in  the Vietnam  War.  As  in hours,  it  is  flat 
in the Reagan  buildup  and  increases  in the Bush  buildup,  despite  the de 
cline  in  manufacturing  hours.  In  the business  sector,  the  real wage  does 
not  significantly  move. 
The  picture  is similar  in the modified  DV  approaches,  except  that now 
manufacturing  hours,  like GDP,  decline  in  the Reagan  buildup  and  in 
crease  (with  a delay)  in  the Bush  buildup.  The manufacturing  real wage 
also  declines  in  the  former  episode  but  increases  with  a  lag  in  the  latter. 
Thus,  in  the modified  approach,  the manufacturing  real wage  moves  in 
the  same  direction  as hours.  The  responses  of  business  sector  hours  are 
similar;  so  are  those  of  the business  sector  real wage,  except  in  the Viet 
nam 
episode. 
The  last  row  displays  the  real  after-tax  consumption  wage  in  the busi 
ness  sector.28  For  neo-Keynesian  models  it is the  real  consumption  wage 
that  is of  particular  interest,  since  only  if  it  increases  can  private  con 
sumption  also  increase.  The  last  row  shows  that  there  is a  close  corre 
spondence  between  the  response  of  this  variable  and  that  of  consump 
tion.  The  real  after-tax  consumption  wage  is  flat  initially  during  the 
Korean  War,  due  to  the  increase  in  taxation,  then  picks  up;  it  increases 
during  the Vietnam  War,  even  if  the  pre-tax  product  wage  falls;  it falls 
during  the Reagan  episode,  and  it is nearly  flat during  the Bush  buildup 
due  to  the  decline  in  taxation. 
Figure  3.10  displays  SVAR  responses  to  a  government  spending 
shock.  In  the LT  specification,  hours  rise  in both  sectors,  and more  in  the 
shorter  sample  starting  in  1954,  although  in  the  case  of manufacturing, 
only  after  a  sharp  but  brief  decline.  The  real wage  increases  in both  sec 
tors,  and much  more  in  manufacturing  (a peak  of  between  3 and  4 per 
cent  after  about  two  years).  In  the  II  specification,  hours  are  flat,  but  the 
real wage  still  increases  in both  sectors.  These  findings  are  consistent 
with  those  of  Fatas  and Milhov  (2001), who  identify  government  spend 
ing  shocks  via  a Choleski  decomposition,  and  of Pappa  (2005), who  uses 
a 
sign-restriction  approach.29 198  Perotti 
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In  the  LT  specification  hourly  labor  productivity  in  manufacturing  is 
flat  in  the  long  sample  and  declines  in  the  long  run  in  the  short  sample 
(this  is  derived  from  a VAR  that  includes  real  manufacturing  value 
added  besides  the  other  seven  variables).  The  increase  in  the manufac 
turing  real wage,  combined  with  a  fall  in productivity,  seems  inconsis 
tent with  the  benchmark  neoclassical  model  with  perfectly  competitive 
goods  and  labor markets.  It is consistent  with  some  neo-Keynesian  mod 
els  with  price  stickiness  or  other  reasons  for  countercyclical  markups 
(although  in general  not  with  models  with  wage  rigidity),  where  the  fall 
in  the markup  allows  the  real product  wage  to rise  despite  the decline  in 
productivity.  Note,  however,  that manufacturing  productivity  increases 
briefly  initially  in  the  short  sample  in  the  II  specification. 
The  last  row  of  the  figure  shows  that  the  after-tax  real  consumption 
wage  in  the business  sector  behaves  very  much  like  the pre-tax  product 
wage;  it only  displays  an  initial  decline,  by  almost  1 percent,  in  the In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  199 
longer  sample;  this  is consistent  with  the positive  response  of  the  tax  rate 
(in  turn  influenced  by  the Korean  War)  documented  in  figure  3.3. 
7.2  Government  Employment  Shocks  and  the  Labor Market 
All  of  the  discussion  so  far  has  implicitly  assumed  that  government 
spending  on  goods  and  services  falls  entirely  on  goods  produced  by  the 
private  sector;  in reality,  typically  about  half  of  it consists  of  government 
wages,  that  is, of  services  produced  by  the  government  sector  itself.  As 
Finn  (1998)  and  Cavallo  (2005)emphasize,  in  the neoclassical  model  the 
distinction  between  government  employment  and  spending  on  goods 
has  important  implications.  Both  types  of  spending  have  a  negative 
wealth  effect  on  the  consumer,  but  for plausible  parameter  values  a gov 
ernment  employment  shock  raises  the  real  private  product  wage  and  re 
duces  private  employment:  the  reason  is  that  the  higher  labor  supply 
caused  by  the negative  wealth  effect  is  less  than  the  increase  in govern 
ment  employment.  Hence,  private  employment  falls,  and  the  real  prod 
uct  wage  in  the  private  sector  increases.  As  shown  in Pappa  (2005),  a 
government  employment  shock  has  similar  effects  on  private  employ 
ment  and  the  real product  wage  in  the private  sector  in a neo-Keynesian 
model  with  price  stickiness. 
I estimate  the  same  benchmark  VARs  as  previously  described,  but 
now  government  spending  is split  into  its  two  components:  real  spend 
ing  on  goods  and  real  spending  on  government  employment.  As  a  mea 
sure  of  the  latter  I take  the  log  of  total  government  employment,  divided 
by  population.30  Figure  3.11  shows  that  the  Ramey-Shapiro  episodes 
were  overwhelmingly  on  goods  expenditure  (in  fact,  government  wage 
expenditure  declined  in  the Reagan  and  Bush  episodes). 
In an  SVAR,  distinguishing  the  two  spending  components  allows  one 
to construct  two  government  spending  shocks  that  turn  out  to have  very 
different  properties.  Column  1 of  figure  3.12  displays  the  responses  to a 
government  employment  shock  of  government  spending  on  wages, 
goods  spending,  and  their  sum  total  government  spending,  then  of GDP, 
consumption,  and  hours  and  the  real wage  in  the  business  sector  and 
manufacturing;  column  2 displays  the  responses  of  the  same  variables, 
but  to a goods  spending  shock.  In all  cases,  the  shocks  are normalized  so 
that  the  impact  response  of  total  government  spending  is equal  to  1 per 
cent  of  GDP.  In  the  figure,  the  government  employment  and  goods 
spending  shocks  are  orthogonalized  in  this  order;  the  results  with  the  al 
ternative  ordering  are nearly  identical.  The  sample  starts  in  1954:1. 200  Perotti 
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Figure  3.11 
Responses  of Government  Spending  on Wages  and  on  Goods  to Ramey-Shapiro  Dummy 
Variables 
In all  specifications,  the  government  employment  shock  generates  a 
highly  persistent  response  of  government  employment  itself,  and  a size 
able  response  of  goods  spending;  in contrast,  the  goods  spending  shock 
generates  virtually  no  response  of  government  employment  and much 
less  persistence  in  total  spending.  Thus,  the  government  employment 
shock  is  much  more  persistent  and more  wage  intensive. 
The  gross  domestic  product  and  consumption  increase much  more  in re 
sponse  to a government  employment  shock:  for GDP,  a peak  of  4 percent 
against  about  .7  percent  in  response  to a goods  spending  shock;  for  con 
sumption,  more  than  1.5 percent  against  .4  percent.  The  responses  of hours 
are  also  very  different:  both  increase  in response  to a government  employ 
ment  shock,  and  both  are  flat  in  response  to a goods  spending  shock.  As 
usual,  the  response  is  stronger  in  manufacturing,  with  a peak  of  about  6 
percent  after  one  year.31 The  product  wage  in  manufacturing  also  responds 
much  more  strongly  to a government  employment  shock;  the business  sec 
tor  real wage,  instead,  is  flat  in both  cases.  In  the  II  specification,  the pic 
ture  is similar,  except  that business  sector  hours  do  not  increase  after  a gov In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  201 
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Figure  3.12 
Responses  to Government  Employment  and  Goods  Expenditure  Shocks,  SVAR 
eminent  employment  shock,  and  now  even  the business  sector  real wage 
responds  positively  to  the  same  shock.  The  standard  errors  in  the  re 
sponses  to  the government  employment  shock,  however,  become  large. 
These  results  are  in  line  with  Pappa  (2005),  who  finds  positive  re 
sponses  of  the  real wage  and,  less  sharply,  of  private  employment  to  a 
government  employment  shock  using  a  sign-restriction  approach;  with 
Linnemann  (2006),  who  estimates  a  trivariate  VAR  with  government 
and  private  employment  and  GDP,  and  finds  similar  positive  responses 
of  private  employment  to  a government  employment  shock;  and  with 
Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1992),  who  find  a  positive  response  of 
private  hours  and  the  real wage  to a  shock  to  military  employment. 
This  pattern  of  responses  thus  appears  to be  inconsistent  with  virtually 
all models  we  have  of  the  effects  of  government  employment  shocks;  in 
fact,  it  is very  difficult  to obtain  a positive  response  of  both private  em 
ployment  and  the  real  private  wage  in  either  a neoclassical  or  a  neo 202  Perotti 
Keynesian  model.  The  neoclassical  model  studied  by  Finn  (1998)  predicts 
a positive  response  of  the  real wage  in the private  sector,  but  only  because 
private  hours  decline;  the neo-Keynesian  model  of  Pappa  (2005)  has  the 
same  predictions,  although  the mechanism  is different.  In Linnemann 
(2006),  government  employment  is complementary  to private  consump 
tion  in  the household's  utility:  if the  complementarity  is strong  enough, 
a  government  employment  shock  can  raise  private  consumption  and 
therefore  private  employment?but  now  the  real wage  must  fall,  as  the 
economy  is  moving  down  a given  labor  demand  in  the private  sector. 
7.3  Annual  Historical  Evidence  on  Labor Markets 
Figure  3.13  presents  responses  to a government  spending  shock  of  1 per 
cent  of GDP  from  the  five-variable  VARs,  which  includes  government 
spending,  GDP  in  the business  sector,  private  consumption,  an  employ 
ment  variable,  and  a  real wage  variable,  using  annual  historical  data.  In 
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the  first  specification,  the  employment  variable  is  full-time  equivalent 
employees  in  the business  sector  (employees  when  the  sample  starts  in 
1889);  the  real wage  variable  is total wage  and  salary  accruals  in the busi 
ness  sector  divided  by  full-time  equivalent  employees  in  the  business 
sector  and  deflated  by  the business  sector  deflator.  In  the  second  speci 
fication,  the  employment  variable  is  full-time  equivalent  employees  in 
manufacturing  the  real wage  variable  is total wages  and  salaries  in  man 
ufacturing  divided  by  full-time  equivalent  employees  and  deflated  by 
the  price  index  of  goods:  this  specification  can  be  estimated  only  from 
1929.  In column  1,  the  sample  starts  in  1889;  in column  2,  in  1929;  in col 
umn  3,  in  1929,  but  the  years  1941-1945  and  1950-1953  are  excluded;  in 
column  4,1946-1947  and  1954-1955  are  also  excluded. 
Both  employment  variables  respond  positively  to  a  government 
spending  shock,  and  again  the  response  gets  stronger  as  one  moves 
rightward  in  the  figure.  Like  before,  manufacturing  employment  re 
sponds  more  strongly  than  business  sector  employment. 
The  real wage  response  is also  positive,  although  now  it  is  stronger 
in the business  sector  and  ceases  to be  significant  in  manufacturing  when 
the major  wars  and  their  aftermaths  are  excluded.  The  II  specification 
gives  a very  similar  picture. 
The  last  two  rows  display  the  paths  of  productivity  per  full-time 
equivalent  employee  (in  the  case  of manufacturing,  this  is derived  from 
a VAR  that  includes  real manufacturing  value  added  in addition  to  the 
other  five  variables).  Labor  productivity  increases  in the business  sector, 
while  it falls  in manufacturing.  Ramey  (2006)  finds  a  similar  result  but 
does  not  look  at  the behavior  of  the  real wage.  As  she  argues,  the pattern 
of  the  productivity  responses  in  the  two  sectors  is  consistent  with  a 
movement  down  a given  labor  demand  in manufacturing,  with  a per 
fectly  competitive  goods  market;  it could  reflect  a  sectoral  shift  toward 
manufacturing  industries,  with  higher  returns  to  scale  than  the  average, 
although  each  individually  has  decreasing  returns  to  scale. 
However,  the  increase  in  the manufacturing  real wage  does  not  seem 
to  square  with  this  interpretation;  as  argued  in  the  discussion  of  the 
quarterly  SVAR,  it is  instead  consistent  with  a  model  with  countercycli 
cal markups. 
8  Evidence  from  the  Input-Output  Tables  of  the United  States 
As  previously  observed,  because  manufacturing  receives  a dispropor 
tionate  share  of  the  increase  in  governments  spending  around  the 
Ramey-Shapiro  episodes,  the  evidence  on  this  sector  is  likely  to be  key 204  Perotti 
to our  understanding  of  the  effects  of  fiscal  policy.  However,  manufac 
turing  consists  of many  industries,  only  a  few  of which  were  the  target 
of  substantial  increases  in  government  spending  during  the  Ramey 
Shapiro  episodes.  An  alternative  approach  to VAR  analysis  could  shed 
new  light. 
The  U.S.  input-output  tables  provide  information  on  government 
purchases  by  sector,  at  4-  and  6-digit  levels,  on  dates  that  are  almost 
exactly  equally  spaced  about  the  starts  of  two  Ramey  and  Shapiro  epi 
sodes:  in  1963  and  1967,  and  in  1977  and  1982.  The  NBER  Manufacturing 
Productivity  Database  contains  annual  information  on  wages,  employ 
ment,  output,  and  producer  prices  in  450  manufacturing  industries 
at  the  4-digit  level  between  1958  and  1991.  These  two  datasets  can  be 
combined  to  obtain  information  on  changes  in  real  government  pur 
chases,  real  output,  hours,  employment,  and  the  real  hourly  product 
wage,  by manufacturing  industry,  during  the  last  two  Ramey-Shapiro 
episodes.32 
Let  G.  denote  all  defense  and  civilian  purchases  by  the  general  gov 
ernment  in  sector  i.33 Let  AGi67/63/Yie3  and  AG/8277/Y^77  denote  the 
changes  in Gf during  the Vietnam  War  and  the Carter-Reagan  buildup, 
as  shares  of  the  initial  year's  industry  output.  Column  3 of  table  3.4  lists 
the  first  ten  industries  in  the  Vietnam  War  and  the  Carter-Reagan 
buildup  by  the  value  of  this  variable;  for  each  of  these  industries,  col 
umn  4  shows  the  share  of  real  government  spending  in output  in  the  ini 
tial  year  of  each  episode,  Gi63/Yi63  and  Gi77/Yi77.  This  list  appears  to 
make  intuitive  sense:  most  industries  in  it are  clearly  defense  related. 
The  next  columns  of  the  table  display  the percentage  changes  of  real  out 
put,  of hours,  and  of  the  real  hourly  product  wage  of  production  work 
ers.  The  percentage  changes  are  calculated  between  the  averages  during 
the  last  two  years  of  the  episodes  (1966-1967  or  1981-1982,  respectively) 
and  the  averages  during  the  first  two  years  (1963-1964  or  1977-1978). 
Not  surprisingly,  virtually  all  these  industries  experienced  a  large  in 
crease  in output  and  hours.  More  interestingly,  in both  episodes  the  real 
product  wage  increased  in eight  industries  out  of  ten. 
In  the  first  row  of  table  3.5,  columns  2  to 4 display  the unweighted  av 
erage  of  AG/67/63/Y^63  in  the  top, middle,  and  bottom  20  industries,  re 
spectively,  by  the  value  of  this  variable;  columns  4  to  6 display  the  sig 
nificance  level  of  their  differences.  The  next  rows  show  that  the  order  of 
the  average  changes  in output,  hours,  and  the  real wage  (all  in devia 
tions  from  trend)  in  the  three  groups  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  average 
change  in  government  spending.34  The  same  applies  to  the  Carter Table  3.4 
Top  Ten  Industries  by  Change  in  Government  Purchases 
_(1)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_(6)_(7)_ 




Ammunition,  exc.  small  arms,  nee. 
1302 
3483  347.62  80.97  260.83  170.01  -3.35 
Small  arms  ammunition  1306  3482  167.75  43.35  151.06  147.81  10.32 
Other  ordnance  and  accessories  1307  3489  116.70  85.83  72.14  57.52  -4.79 
Small  arms  1305  3484  49.50  41.04  113.19  64.86  1.43 
Semiconductors  5702  3674 
43.75 
41.67  94.73  52.88  33.58 
Electronic  components,  nee.  5703  3675  40.92  43.92  97.51  42.70  11.72  Watches  and  clocks  and  parts  6207  3873  29.59  11.72  34.33  17.08  9.02 
Paving  mixtures  and  blocks  3102  2951  29.19  50.36  23.88  8.94  20.24  Architectural  metal  work  4008  3446  25.11  28.37  42.28  20.55  8.21 





Industry  1077  SIC72  ^^  ^  _^kzL  ^*^  AW'-82/77 
*i',77  *i",77  */,77  -"i,77  ^i^ 
Carter-Reagan 
Semiconductors  570200  3674  81.26  25.42  25.76  2.57  1.03 
Electronic  computing  equipm.  510101  3573  60.23  12.53  36.26  -1.12  12.32 
Ammunition,  exc.  small  arms,  nee.  130200  3483  57.44  68.62  -18.80  3.94  -36.28  Aircraft  and  missile  equip.,  nee.  600400  3728  47.04  43.22  -11.69  -1.41  -9.55 
Aircraft  and  missile  engines  and  parts  600200  3724  43.87  52.37  26.48  -5.56  15.41 
Radio  and  TV  communication  equip.  560400  3662  33.48  41.35  27.47  9.94  14.55 
Electrical  industrial  apparatus,  nee.  530800  3629  30.56  12.88  3.04  -7.33  1.82 
Guided  missiles  and  space  vehicles  130100  3761  30.53  82.44  -0.35  -3.13  2.39 
Other  ordnance  and  accessories  130700  3489  27.28  62.05  41.45  18.94  34.16 
Surgical  appliances  and  supplies  620500  3842  24.79  22.03  54.12  21.09  33.40 
Source:  see  text. 
Notes:  Column  1:  Input-Output  Industry  Classification,  1963  and  1977 
editions, 
respectively 
Column  2:  Standard  Industry  Classification,  1972  edition 
(used  in  the  NBER  Manufacturing  Productivity  Database.  Column  3:  change  in  real  government  spending  in  industry  i  between  1967  and  1963,  as  a  share 
of  output  of  industry  i  in  1963.  Column  4:  government  spending  on  industry  i  in  1963,  as  a  share  of  output  of  industry  i  in  1963.  Column  5:  percentage  change  in  output  in  industry  i,  average  of  1966-1967  relative  to 
average 
of  1963-1964.  Column  6:  percentage  change  in  hours  in  industry  i,  average  of  1966-1967  relative  to  average  of  1963-1964.  Column  7:  percentage  change  in  real  hourly  product  wage  in  industry  i,  average  of  1966-1967  relative  to  av 
erage  of  1963-1964.  Similar  definitions  apply  to  the  second  panel.  The  initial  and  end  years  are  1977  and  1982.  The  averages  are  taken  over  the  years 
1977-1978  and  1981-1982.  G  =  total  government  spending  on  the 
sector; 
Y 
=  real  output  of  the  sector;  H  =  hours  of  production  workers  in  the  sector;  W  =  real  hourly  product  wage  of  production  workers  in  the  sector.  In  the  Vietnam  War  panel,  1063  sector  5703  includes  the  SIC72  sectors  3675,  3676, 
3677,  3678,3679,1063  sector  2704  includes  SIC72  sectors  2861,2891,2892,2893,  2895,2899.  In  the  Carter-Reagan  buildup  panel,  1077  sector  600400  in 
cludes  SIC72  sectors  3728,3769;  1077  sector  6002000  includes  SIC72  sectors  3724,3764. In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  207 
Table  3.5 
Average  Changes,  by  Industry 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
(4)_(5)_(6)_(7) 
Top  20  Mid  20  Bottom  20  Top-Middle  Top-Bottom  Mid-Bottom 
Vietnam  War 
(1) 
''67/63 
53.14  3.46  -4.55  0.00  0.00  0.24 
y  1i,63 
Average  log  changes,  deviations  from  trend 
AY 
(5) 
?'-^2-  71.23  22.17  10.96  0.00  0.00  0.33 
^,63 
AU 
(6)  -4^63.  622g  2392  2293  00Q  00Q  Q93 
Hi,63 
(7) 





31.13  0.05  -9.03  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Average  log  changes,  deviations  from  trend 
AY 
(12) 
?^^  39.86  -26.98  -48.78  0.00  0.00  0.10 
*i,77 
(13) -^^  20.39  -14.81  -28.08  0.00  0.00  0.25 
Hi,77 
(14) 
-i^ZZ^  10.86  -8.15  -17.18  0.01  0.00  0.20 
-W^ 
Source:  see  text.  Definition  of  variables:  see  previous  table. 
Reagan  buildup  (rows  8  to  14).  In particular,  the  average  change  in  the 
real  product  wage  is always  highest  in  the  top  20  industries  and  lowest 
in the bottom  20  industries.  For hours  and  output  the difference  between 
the  top  and middle  and  between  the  top  and  bottom  groups  is always 
significant:  for  the  product  wage,  it  is always  significant  in  the Carter 
Reagan  buildup;  in  the Vietnam  War,  only  the  difference  between  the 
top  and  bottom  groups  in  the  detrended  case  is significant. 
Note  also  that  the  average  changes  in  output  and  hours  imply  that 
productivity  on  average  rises  in  the  top  20  industries,  which  experience 
an  increase  in government  purchases,  and  declines  or  is stagnant  in  the 
bottom  20  industries,  which  experience  a  decline  in  government  pur 
chases. 208  Perotti 
Thus,  the  sectoral  evidence  provides  independent  confirmation  of  the 
main  conclusions  of  the  SVAR  evidence  on  labor markets:  the  sectors 
that  experienced  the  largest  government  spending  shocks  are  also  the 
sectors  that  experienced  the  largest  positive  changes  in  the  real  product 
wage.  This  result  is  consistent  with  two-sector  neo-Keynesian  models 
but  not  with  two-sector  neoclassical  models. 
9  Outside  the United  States 
9.1  Quarterly  Data 
The  key  constraint  in  estimating  fiscal  policy  VARs  in  countries  other 
than  the United  States  is the  existence  of noninterpolated  quarterly  data 
on  government  spending  spanning  a  long  enough  period.  I have  as 
sembled  the  relevant  data  for Australia  (1959:3-2006:2),  Canada  (1961:1 
2006:3)  and  the United  Kingdom  (1963:1-2006:2).  As  much  as  possible, 
the  definitions  are  the  same  as  in  the United  States:  all  fiscal  variables 
cover  the  general  government,  government  spending  on  goods  and  ser 
vices  excludes  government  capital  formation  but,  following  the  Na 
tional  Account  guidelines,  includes  most  expenditure  on military  equip 
ment;  private  consumption  includes  nondurables  and  services,  except 
in Australia,  where  it  is  total  private  consumption.  I use  the  same 
benchmark  seven-variable  specification  estimated  for  the United  States, 
except  that,  since  the  average  marginal  income  tax  rate  is not  available 
for  these  countries,  it is replaced  by  the  log  of  real  net  taxes  per  capita.35 
Like  in  the United  States,  the  alternative  specifications  give  nearly  iden 
tical  results. 
Row  1 of  figure  3.14  displays  the  response  of  government  spending, 
GDP,  consumption,  and  investment.  To  facilitate  comparison,  the  first 
column  displays  anew  the U.S.  responses  in the LT  specification  over  the 
shorter  sample  starting  in  1954:1,  the  following  columns  display  Aus 
tralia,  Canada,  the United  Kingdom;  columns  5  to 8 do  the  same  for  the 
II  specification. 
There  are  two  key messages  from  this  table:  the  responses  of GDP  and 
consumption  tend  to be  positive  in  all  countries  and  all  specifications, 
but  they  are  also  smaller  than  in  the United  States,  and  in a  few  cases  in 
significantly  different  from  0. 
In  the  LT  specification,  the  responses  of GDP  and  consumption  are 
positive  and  significant  in all  countries  (although  they  turn  negative  in 
the United  Kingdom  after  six quarters),  but  outside  the United  States  the In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  209 
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Figure  3.14 
Responses  to Government  Spending  Shocks,  All  Countries,  SVAR 
consumption  response  is rarely  larger  than  .5  percentage  points  of GDP, 
against  a peak  of more  than  1 percent  in  the United  States.  A  similar  pat 
tern  is displayed  by  the  II  specification,  except  that  now  GDP  and  con 
sumption  in Canada  are  insignificant,  while  in the United  Kingdom  they 
are  now  positive  and  significant  over  the whole  horizon. 
There  is slightly  less  regularity  across  countries  in  the  response  of  in 
vestment:  in  the  LT  specification,  it  is negative  in  the  United  States, 
Canada,  and  the United  Kingdom  (after  a  small  and  brief  positive  im 
pact  response),  and  positive  in  Australia.  As  in the United  States,  this  re 
sponse  is  driven  by  machinery  and  equipment  investment  and,  to  a 
lesser  extent,  by  structures;  outside  the United  States,  private  residential 
investment  tends  to  increase  slightly,  by  between  .1 and  .2 percent  of 
GDP,  after  a government  spending  shock. 
9.2  Historical  Evidence  with  Annual  Data 
Figure  3.15  displays  impulse  responses  from  a small,  four-variable  SVAR 
in  government  spending,  GDP,  private  consumption,  and  investment, 210  Perotti 
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Figure  3.15 
Responses  to Government  Spending  Shocks,  Annual  Historical  Data,  All  Countries, 
SVAR 
estimated  using  long-run  annual  data  in Australia,  Canada,  and  the 
United  Kingdom,  plus  the United  States  as  a  comparison.36  Over  these 
long  samples,  outside  the United  States  only  total  private  consumption  is 
available.  The  first  four  rows  display  the  responses  of  the  four  variables 
in  the LT  specification,  the next  four  rows  of  the  II  specification, 
For  Australia,  Butlin  (1977)  has  assembled  yearly  data  covering  the 
period  1901-1948.  However,  until  1939  private  consumption  was  com 
puted  residually  from  estimates  of GDP  and  its other  components,  and 
is  thus  unusable;  and most  data  for  the war  years  are  considered  unreli 
able  by  the  author  himself.  The  Australian  Bureau  of  Statistics  now  pub 
lishes  thoroughly  revised  annual  data  on  a number  of  variables  going 
back  to  1949,  with  a  consistent  definition.37  When  the  long  sample? 
combining  the  Butlin  data  up  to  1948  and  the ABA  data  from  1949?is In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  211 
used  (column  3),  the  response  of  consumption  is significantly  negative; 
this  is consistent  with  the mechanical  negative  correlation  between  gov 
ernment  and  private  consumption  due  to  the  residual  nature  of  the  lat 
ter.  When  the VAR  is estimated  from  1949,  thus  using  only  the  consistent 
Australian  Bankers  Association  (ABA)  data  (column  4),  the  response  of 
consumption  is now  positive  (after  a  small  initial  decline),  sizeable  (just 
below  1 percent  of GDP),  and  significant  at  two  years. 
Statistics  Canada  publishes  historical  annual  series  with  a  consistent 
definition  going  back  to  1926. Over  the whole  sample  (column  5),  the  re 
sponse  of  consumption  is  significantly  positive,  with  a peak  of  .6 per 
centage  points  of GDP  after  five  years.  This  is robust  to  the  exclusion  of 
WWII  (column  6),  although  not  in  first  differences  (row  7). 
In  the United  Kingdom,  annual  data  on  the  variables  of  interest  are 
published  in  the Blue  Book  from  1948,  using  a consistent  definition;  Fein 
stein  (1972)  provides  data  going  back  to  1870.  But  up  to about  1920 many 
series  are  considered  unreliable:  GDP,  depending  on  the  decade  gross 
fixed  capital  formation,  consumers'  expenditure  and  central  govern 
ment  spending  get  subjective  reliability  assessments  of  B  or C  (on  a de 
clining  scale  from  A  to C).  For  the  period  1900-1938  "little  information 
on  actual  expenditure  or  retail  sales  is available"  (Feinstein,  45);  and  im 
portantly,  the  results  of  the  government  expenditure  deflation  "are very 
rough,  and  especially  for  the war  years  are  best  treated  with  extreme 
scepticism"  (p. 78). 
Column  7 of  figure  3.15  shows  that  over  the whole  sample,  starting  in 
1870,  consumption  drops  significantly,  to about  -.8  percentage  points  of 
GDP  after  three  years.  These  results  are  robust  to  the  exclusion  of  WWI 
(WWII  is not  in  the  sample  because  there  are  no  data  on  private  invest 
ment  between  1938  and  1946).  But  again,  if one  starts  with  the  official 
data  in  1948  (column  8),  the decline  in consumption  is smaller,  and  is  in 
significantly  different  from  0.38 In  first  differences  (row  7),  consumption 
rises  significantly  above  0. 
As  usual,  it  is  more  difficult  to  identify  a  clear  pattern  in  the  invest 
ment  responses,  but  outside  the United  States  investment  increases  only 
in Australia  in  the  II  specification  and  in Canada  in  the LT  specification 
when  wars  are  excluded. 
Thus,  when  data  of  good  quality  are  used  (in particular,  noninterpo 
lated,  nonresidual  government  spending  and  consumption  data),  out  of 
the  eight  country-specification  pairs  that  exclude  wars,  the  response  of 
consumption  is  significantly  negative  (but  small)  in one  case,  flat  in an 
other,  and  significantly  positive  in  the  remaining  six  cases.  As  in quar 212  Perotti 
Table  3.6 
Cumulative  Multipliers  of Government  Spending  at Two  Years 
USA  AUS  CAN  GBR  USA  AUS  CAN  GBR 
Quarterly,  LT  Quarterly,  II 
GDP  0.98*  1.33*  -0.34  0.57  0.73*  1.26*  -0.46  0.66 
CONS  0.42*  0.35  0.06  0.35  0.27*  0.23  -0.02  0.35* 
Annual,  LT  Annual,  II 
GDP  2.69*  1.13*  1.47*  0.28  3.10*  1.72*  0.21  0.69 
CONS  0.96*  -0.28  0.21*  -0.03  1.01*  -0.24  -0.26*  0.62* 
Notes:  First  panel-cumulative  GDP  and  consumption  multipliers  from  four-variable  VAR 
estimated  on  quarterly  data.  Second  panel-cumulative  GDP  and  consumption  multipliers 
from  the  same  four-variable  VAR,  estimated  on  annual  data.  Samples  for  annual  VARs 
USA:  from  1929,  WWII  and  Korean  War  excluded:  Australia:  from  1949;  Canada:  from 
1926, WWII  excluded;  United  Kingdom:  from  1948.  An  asterisk  indicates  that  0  is outside 
the  region  between  the  two  one-standard  error  bands  at  that  horizon. 
terly  data,  the  consumption  response  tends  to  be  smaller  than  in  the 
United  States. 
Table  3.6  displays  the  cumulative  GDP  and  consumption  multipliers 
of  government  spending  at  two  years  from  the  quarterly  SVARs  (first 
panel)  and  from  the  annual  SVARs  (second  panel),  both  in  the LT  and  in 
the  II  specifications.  In quarterly  data,  the  consumption  multiplier  is 
nearly  0  in Canada;  it is positive  and  quite  similar  (between  .35 and  .45) 
in  the  other  countries,  although  in Australia  it  is not  significant.  In  all 
cases,  the multipliers  in  the LT  and  II  specifications  are  very  close. 
In  annual  data,  in  the United  States  the  consumption  multiplier  is 
large  and  nearly  double  the  quarterly  multiplier,  while  in  the  other 
countries  there  is  more  dispersion. 
9.3  The  Labor Market 
Figure  3.16  displays  the  results  for  labor market  variables  in  the United 
States,  Canada,  and  the United  Kingdom  (in Australia,  data  on wages 
and  employment  are  available  only  from  1983).  These  are  based  on  the 
usual  benchmark  seven-variable  VAR  also  used  to derive  the  responses 
of  consumption  and  investment,  which  includes  g,  t, y,  c, k, e  (a  measure 
of  hours  or  employment),  and  w  (a  measure  of  earnings  or  compensa 
tion).  The  first  row  displays  the  response  of GDP;  the  second  row  of  the 
employment  variable  with  the  largest  coverage  available  (total  employ 
ment  in  the United  States,  the whole  industry  in Canada,  and  all  civilian In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  213 
USA, LT  CAN, LT  GBR, LT  USA,  11  CAN,  11  GBR,  11 
0.9:-/;---. 
j 
0.9  i  ^/^ 
-  ?  - 
0.9-/^---.  ?-9''\C"~  ?-9'  ^~~!o.9-|/^ 
j 
Wil  o.o''  lo.o 
? 
o.o-T-'---.<  o.o--  -N>  ?  I o.o-AvV?i  o.o- ->--...  - -i 
Y,  tot  j  i  ;  v\T  _ _  !  : 
-0.9; 
|-0.9-|  j-0.9]  -0.9]  -0.9i  *'~'  s-0.9;  i 
-1.81:-.r?H  -1.8-i,?n?r  -1.8^?.ij  -1.8V?r  J  -1.8-7?.  l  -1.8^-  -^,,^\ 
0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20 
1.2-1->-;  1.2t-;?;  1.2i-1  1.2t-Tl  1.2|-?- 
\2v ,-1 
0.6-  I/^~  0-6"  ,'/  0.6-  ~N  0.6^ ^r'  0.6- 
;'  j  0.6-j  ]/^  j 
c  t  ,  0.0r-r/------l  O.oiy/-/^-^^  0.01W--V-J  o.o-i-A--  0.01  ^--/-?i  O.OiH??n 
-0.6  jyV  -0.6-J%^  i-0.6i  \\  !-0.6J!^V^__;-0.6] 
*r 
;-0.6-j  | 
.1 _2J-:-  r'?J  -1.2  V-?F  J  -1.2^4^  -1.2  ^.!  -1  ^JXU^XJ  A 2[-^?^~~X 
0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20 
3.2t?^=^h 
3.2-r-  -; 
3.2-|-:t 
3.2t-, 
1.6-j ,/  ^  I  1.6-  1.6- ,/'  1.61 
o.o{--/A--I  0.0  f-v~  O.Q-i-  'A  _  -I  0.0  j-p??  E, man  I  J/1 
'  * ^  -  /  (1^-' 
' 
\ 
-1.6 JV  |-1-6-Vo^'| 
-1-61  N/\ 
-1.6j)^_ 
-3.2L.?t?J  .3.2-L,-^;w  -3.2l-^M'-.'  .3.2-O?  ,V 
0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20 




j  -Z^  j  0.8-j Jv\x  j  0.8-i 
y^ 
_  O.8-1 
^~~~~  0-8|i^-j 
IA/  t  t O.O1^" ?-.  ; o.Of^"-^  0.0-1--4V?i  O.O-^---?^1  0.0-;?---?  ~i  0.0^-^-~-z?i 
W,  tot  i  H  \ 
N 
i  i 
-0.8;  I-O.81  -0.8  \\ 
" 
!-0.8-  J-0.8-J 
-0.8J  I 
-1.6?-.?r!-1.6lt.-,.?.  J-1.6-A?T-^-1.6-r?t?rJ-1.6^r?  -i. ]-1.6ji.,.' 
0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20  0  10  20 
5.4--  5.4i-1  5.4->-5.4-1-r 
3.6- 
lr^  3.6-j  j  3.6J  /  3.6-  '/  _  \ 
W,man 18  /^N^\  18|  /^. 
i  1>8l  !/^~  j  18! 
JX 
\ 
0.0-'^M.r.,,r,-T,14T^0.0-[r-r-r"n-i;  0.0J  ^r>.--r-.T'  0.0" r-r?i?r-i' 
0  5  1015 20  0  5  1015 20  0  5  1015 20  0  5  1015 20 
Figure  3.16 
Responses  of  Labor  Market  Variables,  United  States,  Canada,  and  United  Kingdom,  SVAR 
jobs  in  the United  Kingdom);  the  third  row  of manufacturing  hours  (in 
the United  States)  or  employment  (in Canada).  The  next  two  rows  dis 
play  the  responses  of  the  corresponding  real  product  wages.39 
Outside  the United  States,  it  is surprisingly  difficult  to  find  a positive 
response  of  employment  variables  to a government  spending  shock,  de 
spite  the  positive  GDP  response:  only  in  the United  Kingdom  in  the  II 
specification  can  one  find  a positive  response  of  overall  employment.  In 
all  countries  and  specifications,  the  real  product  wage  increases  signifi 
cantly,  and  again,  more  in  manufacturing. 
9.4  Annual  Historical  Evidence  on  Labor  Markets 
Outside  the United  States  only  Canada  has  long  enough  historical  an 
nual  series  on  employment  and  the  real wage,  and  only  in  manufactur 214  Perotti 
ing.  Figure  3.17  displays  responses  to a government  spending  shock  of 
1 percent  of GDP  from  a  five-variable  SVAR  that  includes  government 
spending,  GDP,  private  consumption,  manufacturing  employment,  and 
the manufacturing  real wage,  exactly  like  that  estimated  for  the United 
States.  And  as  in  the United  States,  manufacturing  employment  rises  in 
Canada,  except  in the  II  specification,  when  wars  are  excluded  (the  same 
specification  that  exhibited  no  increase  in consumption).  The  peak  em 
ployment  response  is between  1 and  2 percent. 
As  in  the  quarterly  SVAR,  the  response  of  the manufacturing  real 
wage  is always  positive  and  significant,  with  peaks  of  above  2 percent 
when  wars  are  excluded. 
10  A  Brief  Review  of  Recent  Models  of  Fiscal  Policy 
This  section  briefly  reviews  the  effects  of  purchases  of  goods  and  ser 
vices  by  the  government  in  the  recent  macro  literature,  to point  out  the 
key  testable  differences.  In all  cases,  I  will  initially  make  the  important 
assumption  that  taxation  is  lump  sum,  implying  that  the  time  path  of 
taxation  has  no  effect  on  the  response  of  the  economy  to  a government 
spending  shock.  I  will  also  assume  that  government  spending  consists 
of  purchasing  goods  produced  by  the  private  sector  that  are  then 
thrown  away,  and  there  is only  one  sector  in  the  economy. 
In the  standard  neoclassical  model  studied  by  Baxter  and  King  (1993), 
a  forward-looking  representative  agent  can  freely  borrow  and  lend  at 
the market  interest  rate;  the production  function  has  constant  returns  to 
scale,  all  prices  are  flexible,  all  goods  and  factor  markets  are  perfectly 
competitive,  and  the  utility  function  is  separable  in  consumption  and 
leisure.  From  the  intertemporal  government  budget  constraint,  an  in 
crease  in government  spending  must  be matched  by  an  increase  in  tax 
ation  of  the  same  value  in present  discounted  value  terms.  Hence,  the  in 
dividual  is poorer  in  lifetime  terms,  and  reduces  his  or her  consumption 
and  leisure;  as  labor  supply  shifts  out,  output  increases  and  the  real 
wage  falls  along  a given  labor  demand. 
Thus,  in  this model  the  effects  of  a  government  spending  shock  on 
consumption  and  the  real wage  follow  directly  from  two  key  features: 
the  negative  wealth  effect  and  the  separability  of  consumption  and 
leisure.  Two  broad  classes  of models  eliminate  or  counteract  these  two 
features  to reach  different  predictions  about  the  response  of private  con 
sumption,  or  the  real wage,  or both. 
In  the nonseparable  model  of Linnemann  (2006),  the  only  difference  is USA  1929  no  wars,  LT  CAN  1926,  no  wars,  LT  USA  1929  no  wars,  11  CAN  1926,  no  wars,  11  USA  1929,  LT  CAN  1926,  LT  .USA  1929,  11  .  _  .  .CAN  1926,  11 
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that  the utility  function  is nonseparable  in  leisure  and  consumption.  As 
leisure  falls  following  the negative  wealth  effect,  the  substitutability  be 
tween  consumption  and  leisure  implies  that  the marginal  utility  of  con 
sumption  must  increase.  Hence,  both  consumption  and  hours  increase. 
However,  as Bilbiie  (2006)  shows,  for  consumption  to  increase  it  must  be 
the  case  that  it  is an  inferior  good;  and  for  consumption  and  hours  to 
move  in  the  same  direction,  one  of  the  two must  be  an  inferior  good. 
The  next  modification  of  the  neoclassical  mechanism  consists  in  al 
lowing  a government  spending  shock  to  cause  a  rightward  shift  in  the 
aggregate  demand  for  labor.  If this  effect  is strong  enough,  the  real wage 
can  increase;  in  turn,  this  can  (but not  necessarily  does)  induce  a higher 
consumption,  through  two  basic  mechanisms:  the  substitution  effect 
and  credit  constraints.  There  is  more  than  one  way  to get  a government 
spending  effect  on  the  aggregate  demand  for  labor:  for  lack  of  a better 
name,  I lump  this  class  of models  based  on movements  in  labor  demand 
that  are  not  caused  by  productivity  shocks  under  the  heading  of  neo 
Keynesian  models. 
1.  Countercyclical  mark-ups.  With  some  monopoly  power  in  the  goods 
market,  labor  demand  is defined  by  the  first  order  condition  for  profit 
maximization  FL(Lt,..  .) 
= 
\ktwt,  where  F  is  the  production  function,  L  is 
labor  demand,  w  is the  real product  wage,  and  jul  is the markup.  If  jx,  falls 
when  government  spending  increases,  from  FLL  <  0  labor  demand  will 
increase  for  a  given  w.  In  the well-known  model  of  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford  (1992),  a  government  spending  shock  increases  current  de 
mand  relative  to  future  demand  and  therefore  raises  the  incentives  to 
undercut  collusive  pricing  between  oligopolistic  firms.  The  only  incen 
tive-compatible  collusive  agreement  is  then  to  reduce  the  mark-up 
when  aggregate  demand  increases. 
In Ravn,  Schmitt-Grohe,  and  Uribe  (2006),  the  demand  function  fac 
ing  each  producer  has  a price-elastic  component  that  is a  function  of  ag 
gregate  demand  and  a price-inelastic  component  that  is a function  of  the 
producer-specific  habit.  An  increase  in  aggregate  demand,  caused,  for 
instance,  by  a  shock  to government  spending,  increases  the  share  of  the 
price-elastic  component  and  thus  the  elasticity  of demand,  which  in turn 
makes  the markup  countercyclical. 
2.  Nominal  rigidities.  With  price  stickiness,  monopolistically  competi 
tive  firms  meet  the  extra  demand  caused  by  a  government  spending 
shock  by  supplying  more  output;  labor  demand  increases  as  output 
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tional  on  a government  spending  shock).  As  shown  in Linnemann  and 
Schabert  (2003),  if the  interest  rate  rule  does  not  put  too much  weight  on 
output,  the  real wage  can  increase  despite  the  shift  in  labor  supply.  Note 
that  the nature  of  the  rigidity  matters:  with  wage  rigidity,  the  real wage 
might  well  fall  after  a government  spending  shock. 
3.  Increasing  returns.  In Devereux,  Head,  and  Lapham  (1996),  higher 
government  spending  raises  the  equilibrium  number  of  firms  that  can 
operate  in  the  intermediate  good  sectors,  where  there  are  increasing  re 
turns  to  specialization.  Hence,  the  productivity  of  all  firms  in  the  sec 
tor  increase,  and  despite  the  standard  negative  wealth  effect  on  labor 
supply  the  resulting  outshift  in  labor  demand  can  lead  to a higher  equi 
librium  real wage.  A  similar  mechanism  operates  in Bilbiie,  Ghironi,  and 
Melitz  (2005). 
Once  the  real wage  rises  because  of  one  of  these  three  mechanisms, 
there  are  basically  two  ways  to  get  a  rise  in  consumption.  First,  the 
higher  real wage  induces  individuals  to  substitute  from  leisure  into  con 
sumption,  thereby  inducing  an  increase  in consumption:  this  is the  route 
taken  by  Ravn,  Schmitt-Grohe,  and  Uribe  (2006)  and  Devereux,  Head, 
and  Lapham  (1996).  In  models  with  nominal  rigidities,  in general  the  in 
crease  in  the  real wage  will  not  be  enough,  by  itself,  to generate  an  in 
crease  in  consumption.  The  second  route,  taken  by  Gali,  Lopez-Salido, 
and  Valles  (2006),  is  then  to  appeal  to  credit  constraints:  a  share  of  the 
population  cannot  borrow  or  lend,  and  consume  all  their  labor  income 
in each  period.  As  the  real wage  increases,  their  consumption  increases, 
too. With  enough  of  these  individuals,  the model  can  generate  a positive 
response  of  total  private  consumption  to  a  government  spending 
shock.40 
Note  that,  in order  to generate  a positive  consumption  response,  these 
models  need  a  substantial  real wage  response.  This  runs  counter  to  the 
notion  that  real wages  tend  to be  acyclical  (unconditionally)  over  the 
cycle.  But  the  evidence  we  have  seen  is that  they  can  be  quite  responsive 
to government  spending  shock. 
Table  9.7  summarizes  the  key  results  discussed  in  this  section. 
This  classification  is  obviously  rather  schematic.  As  we  have  seen, 
neo-Keynesian  models  are  consistent  with  a wide  variety  of  responses, 
depending,  for  instance,  on  the  nature  of  the  nominal  rigidity  and  the 
behavior  of  the monetary  authorities.  But  in one  sense  it remains  useful: 
because  of  the wealth  effect,  with  lump-sum  taxation  the  neoclassical 
model  unambiguously  generates  a decline  in private  consumption  fol 218  Perotti 
Table  3.7 
Models  of Government  Spending 
Ls  Ld  L  Y  W/P  C 
Neoclassical  t  =  T  T I i 
Nonseparable  utility  T  =  T  T  i  T 
Neo-Keynesian  t  t  t  T  T T 
Note:  A  (T)  indicates  that  the  real wage  or  consumption  can  increase  if the  shift  in  labor  de 
mand  is  large  enough. 
lowing  a government  spending  shock.  As  Ricardo  Reis  points  out  in his 
discussion,  with  distortionary  taxation  the  fiscal  reaction  function  be 
comes  important,  and  depending  on  its parameters  one  can  generate 
any  impact  response  of  the  endogenous  variables  in  the  neoclassical 
model;  but  even  in  this  case,  one  would  need  rather  extreme  patterns  of 
intertemporal  substitution  to  generate  a  (temporary)  increase  in  con 
sumption  in response  to a negative  wealth  effect.  And  most  importantly, 
the present  discounted  value  of  consumption  must  fall  even  more  for  a 
given  increase  in  government  spending,  if  taxation  is  distortionary; 
hence,  although  on  impact  consumption  might  fall  and  the  real wage  in 
crease,  at  some  point  they must  move  in  the neoclassical  directions.  It is 
in  this  sense  that  positive  responses  of  private  consumption  and  of  the 
real wage  at  all  horizons  are  inconsistent  with  the  neoclassical  model, 
regardless  of  the  fiscal  reaction  function  in place. 
11  Conclusions 
Are  wars  normal  events  from  the point  of view  of  fiscal  policy,  only  big 
ger?  If  they  are,  it  is difficult  to  escape  the  conclusion  that  private  con 
sumption  declines  in response  to a shock  to government  spending:  wars 
are  plausibly  exogenous,  and  during  WWII  the  share  in GDP  of  govern 
ment  spending  on  goods  and  services  more  than  tripled  in  four  years, 
from  14.8  percent  in  1940  to  47.9  percent  in  1944,  while  private  con 
sumption  of nondurables  and  services  declined  from  62.6  to 46.4  percent 
of GDP.  But  even  outside  wars,  there  is fiscal  action  that  can  be  exploited: 
the problem  is how  to disentangle  its exogenous,  unanticipated  compo 
nent.  The  narrative,  or  dummy  variable  approach  tries  to combine  both 
ideas  by  looking  at  the  typical  deviation  from  the normal  path  of  the  en 
dogenous  variable  caused  by  a series  of post-war  abnormal  fiscal  events, 
namely  four military  buildups  driven  by  foreign  policy,  that  can  plausi 
bly  be  regarded  as  exogenous  and  unanticipated.  In  its original  version, In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  219 
the method  assumes  that  these  abnormal  fiscal  events  are  entirely  (in  the 
DV3  approach),  or  almost  entirely  (in  the DV1  and  DV2  approaches) 
responsible  for  all  the  deviation  from  normal  of  all  the variables  during 
a horizon  that  is typically  assumed  to be  between  six  and  eight  quarters. 
Under  these  assumptions,  the method  delivers  results  that,  especially  in 
the DV1  and  DV2  method,  are  supportive  of  the  key  neoclassical  mech 
anism:  in  response  to a government  spending  shock,  private  consump 
tion  and  the  real wage  fall. 
But  possibly  a better  interpretation  of  the  logic  itself  of  the  exercise 
consists  in  isolating  the  abnormal  fiscal  events  and  estimating  the  nor 
mal  response  of  the  nonfiscal  endogenous  variables  to  these  events. 
Thus,  this method  allows  for  a number  of  nonfiscal  shocks  to hit  the 
economy  during  the  time  of  the  abnormal  fiscal  event.  In  this  case,  the 
estimated  normal  response  of  consumption  to  abnormal  events  is now 
typically  positive.  This  is consistent  with  the  impulse  responses  from  an 
approach  based  on  a  structural  VAR.  This  last  approach  is  subject  to  a 
different  type  of  criticism:  its estimated  shocks  might  not  be  really  unan 
ticipated  by  the  private  sector.  To  address  this  problem,  Ramey  (2006) 
proposes  to  estimate  SVARs  with  long-run  annual  data.  I  show  that, 
when  reliable  noninterpolated  data  are  used,  the  evidence  again  sup 
ports  the notion  that  the  responses  of  consumption  and  of  the  real wage 
to  a  government  spending  shock  are  positive.  Independent  evidence 
from  the U.S.  input-output  tables  also  indicates  that  the  real  product 
wage  increased  more  in  those  sectors  that  experience  the  greater  in 
crease  in government  spending  as  a  share  of  their  output. 
Obviously  there  are many  open  questions,  both  in  terms  of method 
ology  and  in  terms  of  evidence.  I  will  indicate  only  two.  It is  frequently 
asserted  that  government  spending  is  more  effective  in  stimulating  the 
economy  in  times  of  recessions  and  low-capacity  utilization.  Although  I 
know  of no model  that  formalizes  this  idea,  it is easy  to  see how  a  model 
with  occasionally  binding  credit  constraints  could  generate  this  result. 
In ongoing  research  with  Ilian Milhov,  we  indeed  find  preliminary  evi 
dence  that  shocks  to government  spending  generate  a higher  GDP  and 
private  consumption  response  in  times  of  low GDP  growth. 
A  second  open  issue  concerns  the  stability  of  the  results  across  peri 
ods.  The  variances  of  output  and  inflation  have  declined  considerably 
after  about  1980,  and  a growing  literature  studies  how  changes  in  the 
conduct  of monetary  policy  and  in  its  transmission  mechanism  might 
have  contributed  to  this  decline.  There  is  evidence  (see  Perotti  [2004] 
and  Romer  and  Romer  [2006])  that  both  the  variance  of  fiscal  policy 220  Perotti 
shocks  and  their  effects  on GDP  and  consumption  have  also  declined  in 
the  last  20 years.  Investigating  this  issue  further  seems  important  to pro 
mote  our  understanding  of  the  transmission  mechanism  of  fiscal  policy. 
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Endnotes 
1.  All  this  assumes  lump-sum  taxation.  As  Ricardo  Reis  points  out  in his  discussion,  when 
taxation  is distortionary  intra-  and  inter-temporal  substitution  effects  can  generate  any 
pattern  of  responses  of  consumption  and  the  real wage  on  impact,  depending  on  the  tem 
poral  profile  of  the  tax  rate  (see,  e.g.,  Ludvigson  [2007]).  It remains  true,  however,  that  in 
present-value  terms  private  consumption  must  fall,  because  of  the  negative  wealth  effect: 
hence,  persistently  positive  responses  of  private  consumption  and  of  the  real wage  would 
not  be  consistent  with  the  neoclassical  model.  See  section  3.10  for  a brief  review  of  recent 
models  of  fiscal  policy. 
2.  To  estimate  the  effects  of  fiscal  shocks  on  interest  rates  one  probably  needs  to  impose 
more  structure  than  is present  in  the  SVARs  discussed  in  this  paper.  In  fact,  Favero  and  Gi 
avazzi  (2007)  include  debt  and  the  cross-equation  restrictions  implied  by  the  dynamic  gov 
ernment  budget  in  a Blanchard-Perotti  SVAR.  They  show  that while  the  responses  of  all 
other  variables  are  unaffected,  it  is now  possible  to more  precisely  estimate  a positive  re 
sponse  of  the  interest  rate  to government  spending  shocks.  Dai  and  Philippon  (2006)  also 
add  more  structure  to  a  Blanchard-Perotti  SVAR  by  incorporating  information  from  a 
large  cross-section  of  bond  prices:  again,  they  find  a positive  response  of  interest  rates  to a 
deficit  shock. 
3.  For  a  comparison  of  the  effects  of  government  consumption  and  government  invest 
ment  shocks,  see  Creel,  Monperrus-Veroni,  and  Saraceno  (2007)  and  Perotti  (2007). 
4.  In  a promising  recent  development,  Romer  and  Romer  (2006)  identify  shocks  to  rev 
enues  in  the  postwar  period  from  a detailed  analysis  of  government  documents. 
5.  Using  a  standard  neoclassical  model,  Cooley  and  Ohanian  (1997)  and  Ohanian  (1997) 
show  that  the  different  time  profiles  of  the  tax  rates  during  WWII  versus  the Korean  War 
in  the United  States,  and  during  WWII  and  the  postwar  period  in  the United  Kingdom  ver 
sus  the United  States  had  important  effects  on  output  and  welfare. 
6.  This  is an  annual  variable  calculated  by  Barro  and  Sahasakul  (1983)  and  (1986),  updated 
by  Stephenson  (1998)  up  to  1996  and  by myself  afterward. In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  221 
7. McGrattan  and  Ohanian  (2006)  emphasize  this  interpretation  of  the  biggest  such 
episode  of  all, WWII. 
8.  One  could  argue  that,  in a  sense,  all  changes  in  fiscal  policy  are  discretionary:  in  theory, 
policymakers  can  always  undo  the  effects  of  changes  in output  and  prices  on  revenues  and 
spending.  While  this might  be  true  over  the  long  run,  with  quarterly  data  the  distinction 
appears  meaningful. 
9.  Importantly,  these  values  of  the  elasticities  of  government  revenues  and  transfers  are 
not  estimated  but  are  computed  from  institutional  information  on  statutory  tax  brackets, 
the  distribution  of  taxpayers  by  income  classes,  the  statutory  unemployment  benefit,  and 
soon. 
10.  The  ordering  of  the  remaining  variables  is  immaterial  if one  is only  interested  in  esti 
mating  the  effects  of  fiscal  policy  shocks,  as  is  the  case  in  this  paper. 
11. McGrattan  and  Ohanian  (2006)  estimate  transition  matrices  for  different  states  (i.e., 
levels  of  government  spending)  in each  year  of WWII;  once  fed  into  a  standard  neoclassi 
cal model,  they  accurately  explain  the  behavior  of  consumption  during  WWII. 
12.  Net  taxes  are  defined  as  tax  revenues  less  transfers  to households  and  subsidies. 
13.  According  to National  Income  Account  guidelines,  defense  machinery  and  equip 
ment  should  be  classified  as  government  consumption.  The  United  States,  unlike  other 
OECD  countries,  classifies  a  substantial  part  of  these  items  as  government  capital  forma 
tion  (see  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  and  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  [1988]). 
14.  The  OECD  estimates  of  these  elasticities  start  in  1960:  for  1947-1959,1  have  assumed 
the  1960  value.  This  is  certainly  a  crude  approximation,  but  note  that  the  estimated  re 
sponses  to  a  government  spending  shock,  on  which  this  paper  focuses,  are  virtually  in 
variant  to  the  tax  elasticities.  Based  on  the  identifying  assumption  that  discretionary  gov 
ernment  spending  cannot  react  to  output  within  a  quarter,  I have  assumed  a  quarterly 
government  spending  output  elasticity  of  zero.  I have  also  assumed  a quarterly  contem 
poraneous  elasticity  of  real government  spending  to  the price  level  of-.5  (which  would  fol 
low  if half  of  government  consumption  were  fixed  in nominal  terms  within  a given  quar 
ter). 
The  value  of  the  elasticity  of  personal  income  taxes  to  income  computed  by  the OECD 
displays  a  large  discrete  drop  in  1992.  Nothing  would  change  if one  were  to use  the  aver 
age  value  of  this  elasticity  over  the  sample,  or  a  smoothed  version  of  it. 
15.  For  simplicity,  and  somewhat  improperly,  I will  continue  to  use  the  expression 
"SVAR"  in  these  cases. 
16.  Although  the  timing  is not  exactly  right  because  the  average  marginal  income  tax  rate 
is an  annual  variable,  this  increase  captures  the  Tax  Equity  and  Responsibility  Tax  Act  of 
1982. 
17.  Eichenbaum  and  Fisher  (2004)  argue  precisely  that  the  different  responses  of  taxes  in 
the  Bush  build-up,  relative  to  the  typical  response  estimated  via  the DV2  method  during 
the Ramey-Shapiro,  explains  the  decline  in GDP. 
18.  Gali,  Lopez-Salido,  and  Valles  (2007)  also  start  the  sample  in  1954:1,  and  find  similarly 
higher  responses  of  consumption. 
19.  The  responses  of  the  components  of  private  investment  are  obtained  from  seven 
variable  SVARs  in which  total  private  investment  is  replaced  by  each  component  in  turn. 222  Perotti 
20.  Ramey  (2006)  finds  that  the  government  spending  shock  does  not  Granger  cause  the 
Ramey-Shapiro  dummy.  However,  to  assess  whether  the  latter  is  forecastable,  there  is no 
reason  to  limit  oneself  to  the  government  spending  shock  as  a predictor;  in  fact,  the  esti 
mated  tax  and  GDP  shocks  are  equally  plausible  candidates,  and  turn  out  to have  more 
forecasting  power. 
21.  I thank  Alan  Auerbach  for  providing  the  data. 
22.  The  fiscal  shocks  are  derived  from  VARs  estimated  on  the  full  and  shorter  sample,  re 
spectively.  Obviously,  the  ^-values  of  table  3.3  are  obtained  from  a  regression  estimated 
with  the  semiannual  data  that  start  in  1984:1. 
23.  Because  the  Barro-Sahasakul  tax  rate  is an  annual  variable,  to obtain  tax  shocks  in  this 
section  I replace  this  variable  with  the  log  of  real  per  capita  net  taxes. 
24.  The  other  key  variable  in  this  paper,  private  consumption  expenditure,  also  has  im 
portant  problems  prior  to  1929.  In  Kendrick's  work,  this  variable  is  obtained  from 
Kuznet's  "flow  of  goods  to  consumers"  by  subtracting  government  direct  services  to  con 
sumers,  in  turn  proxied  by  personal  tax  and  nontax  payments.  This  is already  a  rough  ap 
proximation;  in addition,  some  components  of  this  variable  are  interpolated  by  a  straight 
line,  such  as  state  and  local  personal  tax  receipts  between  1890,1902,  and  1913.  Also,  prior 
to  1919  there  were  no  data  on  consumer  expenditures  on  services;  Kuznets  used  the  ratio 
of  expenditure  on  services  and  on  commodities  "from  occasional  family  budget  studies" 
(Kendrick,  1961,38). 
25.  This  uses  the Kuznets-Kendrick  data  until  1929,  ratio-linked  with  the  BEA  data  after 
ward.  Results  with  the  Balke  and  Gordon  (1989)  GNP  series  are  virtually  identical. 
26.  Until  1929,  consumption  of  nondurables  and  services  is not  separately  available. 
27.  The  nature  of  the  friction  is  important  here:  in  general,  models  with  nominal  wage 
rigidity  do  not  have  the  same  prediction. 
28.  The  after-tax  wage  is  computed  by  multiplying  compensation  in  the  business  sector 
times  1  less  the  average  marginal  income  tax  rate. 
29.  Using  a Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (BLS)  series  of  producer  prices  in  manufacturing  (dis 
continued  after  1996:1)  to deflate  nominal  manufacturing  earnings,  Edelberg,  Eichenbaum, 
and  Fisher  (2003)  and  Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and  Fisher  (2004)  find  a persistent  decline  in 
real  product  earnings  in  the DV1  and  DV2  approaches,  respectively.  When  I use  this  series 
(kindly  provided  to  me  by  Jonas  Fisher),  I also  find  a decline  in  manufacturing  earnings  in 
the DV1  approach  and  in each  of  the  episodes  separately,  and  also  in  the  SVAR  approach. 
30.  The  response  of  government  employment  is  converted  into  the  response  of  govern 
ment  spending  on wages  by  multiplying  the  former  by  the  average  share  of  government 
wages  in GDP. 
31.  To  put  this  response  in perspective,  note  that  a  shock  to  the wage  component  of  1 per 
cent  of  GDP  is  roughly  equivalent  to  a  shock  of  10 percent  to  government  employment, 
given  government  wages. 
32.  The  hourly  wage  is obtained  by  dividing  total  production  worker  wages  by  the  total 
number  of  hours  of  production  workers. 
33.  The  input-output  tables  do  not  provide  separate  information  on  the  fixed  capital  for 
mation  component  of  nondefense  spending,  which  was  excluded  from  the  definition  of 
the  government  spending  variable  in  the VARs  estimated  so  far. In Search  of  the Transmission  Mechanism  of Fiscal  Policy  223 
The  tables  contain  data  on  both  direct  and  total  government  purchases,  but  for  the  1977 
and  1982  tables  only  the  latter  information  is  available  by  industry  (as  opposed  to  com 
modities).  Thus,  in  this  section  the  expression  government  purchases  refers  to direct  plus  in 
direct  purchases. 
The  real  values  are  computed  by  deflating  the  nominal  quantities  provided  by  the  in 
put-output  tables  by  the  industry's  price  index  of  shipments  in  the NBER  Manufacturing 
Productivity  Database. 
34.  In her  discussion,  Valerie  Ramey  makes  the point  that  one  should  take  into  account  to 
tal  factor  productivity  (TFP)  growth  in evaluating  the  average  responses  of  the  real  prod 
uct  wages.  However,  this  response  in  the  top  group  of  industries  in  table  3.5  is positive 
even  after  the  real wage  has  been  detrended. 
35.  In  the  case  of Australia,  data  on wages  and  employment  are  available  only  from  1980. 
Hence,  these  two  variables  are  replaced  by  the GDP  deflator  inflation  rate  and  by  the  three 
months  interest  rate. 
Germany  also  has  quarterly  data,  but  the  amount  of  detail  from  the  primary  source  is 
limited  and  the  large  break  in  1989 makes  it difficult  to  estimate  a  meaningful  VAR.  Hep 
pke-Falk,  Tenhofen,  and Woolf  (2006)  estimate  a SVAR  on  German  data  between  1974:1 
2004:4,  prolonging  the  data  for Germany  after  1991  backward  using  West  German  growth 
rates,  and  find  a  positive  response  of  private  consumption  to  a  government  spending 
shock.  A  few  other  countries,  such  as  France  and  Italy,  have  data  starting  in  1980,  but  the 
amount  of  interpolation  is unclear. 
36.  Long-run  data  for  labor  market  variables  are  available  only  for  the United  States  and 
Canada,  hence  the  smaller  four-variable  specification  to  ensure  consistency  across  coun 
tries. 
37.  On  overlapping  years,  the  discrepancy  between  the nominal  values  of  these  series  and 
the  earlier  national  account  estimates,  themselves  more  consistent  with  Butlin's  estimates 
for  1901-1939,  can  be  of  the  order  of  100  percent  for  some  series. 
38.  In  addition,  the  decline  in  the  post-war  period  is entirely  due  to  the  years  1974-1976, 
when  government  spending  increased  substantially  in  response  to  what  was  perceived  as 
a  temporary  negative  shock. 
39.  This  is:  in  row  4,  hourly  business  sector  compensation  deflated  by  its  own  deflator 
(United  States);  average  weekly  earnings  of  all  employees  in  the  industrial  composite,  de 
flated  by  the GDP  deflator  (Canada);  average  earnings  index  for  the whole  economy,  de 
flated  by  the GDP  deflator  (United  Kingdom).  In  row  5,  average  weekly  earnings  of man 
ufacturing  production  workers  (United  States)  and  employees  (Canada),  deflated  by  the 
manufacturing  PPI. 
40.  Lopez-Salido  and  Rabanal  (2006),  Forni,  Monteforte,  and  Sessa  (2006),  and  Coenen 
and  Straub  (2005)  all  estimate  small  DSGE  models  with  credit-constrained  households. 
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